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Abstract
Collective action is required to enter sustainable development pathways in coupled social-
ecological systems, safely away from dangerous tipping elements. Yet, in order to investigate
the preconditions for cooperation, there is the challenge how to formally understand such
social-ecological systems from a conceptual, mathematical modelers perspective.
Without denying the usefulness of other model design principles, this thesis proposes the
agent-environment interface as the mathematical foundation for the design of social-ecological
system models. From this perspective, it extends the concept of a social dilemma to a
social-ecological dilemma. Social dilemmas have often been studied by evolutionary dynamics
in repeated games with only one environmental state. Instead, this thesis uses stochastic
games with multiple environmental states to investigate social-ecological dilemmas. Thereby,
it extends the domain of social physics to social-ecological physics.
Yet, the majority of previously used evolutionary dynamics are not able to deal with
multi-state environments. Therefore, this thesis focuses on the related concept of learning
dynamics. It refines techniques from the statistical physics literature on learning dynamics
to derive a deterministic limit of established reinforcement learning algorithms from artificial
intelligence research. This enables a dynamical systems perspective on reinforcement learning
in multi-state environments. Illustrations of the resulting learning dynamics of different
learning algorithms across multiple example environments reveal a wide range of different
dynamical regimes, such as fixed points, periodic orbits and deterministic chaos.
Eventually, this thesis applies the derived multi-state learning equations to a particular
newly introduced environment, referred to as the Ecological Public Good. It models a coupled
social-ecological dilemma, extending established repeated social dilemma games, such as
the Prisoner’s dilemma, by an ecological tipping element. The preconditions for both the
emergence and stability of cooperation are investigated using a combination of numerical
and analytical methods. This model is able to explain empirical observations as well as
to reproduce known theoretical results. Novel qualitatively different parameter regimes
are discovered, including one in which agents prefer to collectively suffer in environmental
collapse rather than cooperating in a prosperous environment. Further, it can be shown that
cooperation can remain stable despite considerable shortsightedness of the agents. However,
this is only the case if the expected damage in the case of collapse is large. Conversely, this
means that such reward-optimizing learners will break off the cooperation agreement, if they
do not believe in likely and severe consequences of a tipping catastrophe.
Since optimization approaches have also been criticized in other contexts of environmental
governance, this thesis challenges the reward optimizing paradigm of the learning equations.
Prominent alternatives to the decision paradigm of economic optimization are sustainability
and the safe operating space. This thesis presents a novel formal comparison of these three
decision paradigms for the governance of an environmental tipping element. There, it can be
shown that optimization alone can lead to safe and sustainable behavior and policies, but is
by no means guaranteed to do so. In fact, no paradigm guarantees fulfilling requirements
imposed by another paradigm. Further, the absence of a master paradigm is shown to be of
special relevance for governing the climate system, since the latter may reside at the edge
between parameter regimes where economic welfare optimization becomes neither sustainable
nor safe.
In summary, this thesis demonstrates the usefulness of the agent-environment interface for
the design of social-ecological system models, leading to a deeper theoretical understanding
of such systems and in particular of the preconditions for successful collective action towards
ecologically safe and socially just sustainability.
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Zusammenfassung
Kollektives Handeln ist erforderlich um nachhaltige Entwicklungspfade in gekoppelten sozial-
ökologischen Systemen zu erschließen, fernab von gefährlichen Kippelementen. Um die
Voraussetzungen für die notwendige Kooperation zu erforschen, besteht jedoch aus der
Sicht eines konzeptionellen, mathematischen Modellierers die Herausforderung, wie solche
sozial-ökologischen Systeme formal zu verstehen sind.
Ohne anderen Modellierungsprinzipien ihren Nutzen abzuerkennen, schlägt diese Disserta-
tion die Agent-Umwelt Schnittstelle als die mathematische Grundlage für das Modellieren
sozial-ökologischer Systeme vor. Aus dieser Perspektive heraus erweitert sie das Konzept
eines sozialen Dilemmas zu einem sozial-ökologischen Dilemma. Soziale Dilemmata werden
oft mit Hilfe evolutionärer Dynamiken in sich wiederholenden Spielen mit nur einem Um-
weltzustand untersucht. Diese Arbeit dagegen verwendet stochastische Spiele, die mehrere
Umweltzustände besitzen können, zur Untersuchung sozial-ökologischer Dilemmata. Damit
erweitert sie den Bereich der Sozialphysik zu sozial-ökologischer Physik.
Jedoch ist die Mehrheit der bisher verwendeten evolutionären Dynamiken nicht in der
Lage mit Umwelten umzugehen, die aus mehreren Zuständen bestehen. Daher konzentriert
sich diese Arbeit auf das verwandte Konzept der Lerndynamiken. Sie erweitert eine Methode
aus der Literatur der statistischen Physik über Lerndynamiken, um einen deterministischen
Grenzübergang von etablierten Verstärkungslernalgorithmen aus der Forschung zu künstlicher
Intelligenz herzuleiten. Diese erlauben eine dynamische Systemperspektive auf das Lernen
in Umwelten mit mehreren Zuständen. Die resultierenden Lerndynamiken verschiedener
Algorithmen zeigen in mehreren Beispielumwelten eine große Bandbreite verschiedener
dynamischer Regime wie z.B. Fixpunkte, Grenzzyklen oder deterministisches Chaos.
Schließlich werden die hergeleiteten Lerngleichungen auf eine bestimmte, neu eingeführte
Umwelt angewendet, hiermit bezeichnet als Ökologisches Öffentliches Gut. Sie modelliert ein
gekoppeltes sozial-ökologisches Dilemma und erweitert damit etablierte soziale Dilemmaspiele
wie z.B. das Gefangenendilemma um ein ökologisches Kippelement. Es werden die Vorausset-
zungen sowohl für die Entstehung als auch für die Stabilität von Kooperation mit Hilfe einer
Kombination aus numerischen und analytischen Methoden untersucht. Dieses Modell ist in
der Lage sowohl empirische Beobachtungen zu erklären als auch zuvor bekannte theoretische
Ergebnisse zu reproduzieren. In dieser Arbeit werden neuartige, qualitativ verschiedene
Parameterregime aufgezeigt, darunter eines, in dem Agenten es vorziehen, gemeinsam unter
einem Kollaps der Umwelt zu leiden, als in einer florierenden Umwelt zu kooperieren. Weiter
kann gezeigt werden, dass Kooperation trotz beträchtlicher Kurzsichtigkeit der Agenten
stabil bleiben kann. Dies ist jedoch nur dann der Fall, wenn der zu erwartende Schaden
im Falle eines Kollapses groß ist. Umgekehrt bedeutet dies, dass belohnungsoptimierende
Lern-Agenten die Kooperationsvereinbarung kündigen, wenn sie nicht an die Möglichkeit
und die schwerwiegenden Folgen einer Kipp-Katastrophe glauben.
Da auch in anderen Zusammenhängen von Umweltmanagement Optimierungsansätze
kritisiert wurden, stellt diese Arbeit das Optimierungsparadigma der Lern-Agenten in Frage.
Prominente Alternativen zum Entscheidungsparadigma der ökonomischen Optimierung sind
Nachhaltigkeit und der sichere Handlungsraum. Diese drei Paradigmen werden systematisch
miteinander verglichen, während diese auf das Management eines umweltlichen Kippelements
angewendet werden. Es kann gezeigt werden, dass Optimierung allein dazu in der Lage ist,
zu sicherem und nachhaltigem Verhalten bzw. Politiken zu führen, dies jedoch keineswegs
garantiert ist. Tatsächlich ist es so, dass kein Paradigma garantiert, Anforderungen anderer
Paradigmen zu erfüllen. Darüber hinaus wird gezeigt, dass das Fehlen eines Meisterparadigmas
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von besonderer Bedeutung für das Klimasystem ist, da dieses sich möglicherweise am Rand
zwischen Parameterbereichen befindet, wo ökonomische Optimierung weder nachhaltig noch
sicher wird.
Insgesamt zeigt diese Dissertation damit die Nützlichkeit des Konzepts der Agent-Umwelt
Schnittstelle für die Modellierung sozial-ökologischer Systeme. Dies führt zu einem tieferen
theoretischen Verständnis solcher Systeme und insbesondere der Voraussetzungen für gelingen-
des, kollektives Handeln in Richtung ökologisch sicherer und sozial gerechter Nachhaltigkeit.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
That’s the beauty of grand opera: you can do anything
...as long as you sing it.
Anna Russell
1.1 Sustainability in coupled social-ecological systems
Sustainability. Prospering within planetary boundaries is the human quest of the
21st century (Rockström and Klum, 2012). Planetary boundaries are critical thresh-
olds of nine key Earth system processes that, if crossed, are likely to cause the Earth
system to tip into a disastrous, unfavorable state for humanity (Rockström et al.,
2009b). Two examples of such processes are climate change and the loss of biosphere
integrity. Both have been associated with the two core planetary boundaries, each
of which has the potential on its own to drive the Earth system into a new state,
should they be substantially and persistently transgressed (Steffen et al., 2015a).
Thus, these nine planetary boundaries constitute a safe operating space for humanity
with respect to the Earth system (Rockström et al., 2009a).
It has been put forward that humanity must not only stay below planetary
boundaries, but simultaneously above social foundations (Raworth, 2012). Examples
of such social foundations include basic education, decent health or the ending of
poverty (Raworth, 2017). They derive themselves from the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UN General Assembly, 1948) which constitutes a global perspective
of the minimum standards required for a prospering human life in dignity. Together,
planetary boundaries and social foundations delineate a safe and just operating space
for humanity (Raworth, 2012, 2017).
Collective human action is required to enter such a safe and just operating space
(Griggs et al., 2013; Steffen et al., 2018). From a practical policy perspective,
important declarations in this regard include the United Nations’ Brundtland report
(WCED, 1987), which sets the course towards sustainable development. Influenced by
human rights and planetary boundaries concepts, the resolution of the 17 Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs, UN General Assembly, 2015) and the adoption of the
Paris Agreement on climate change (COP, 2015) in the same year mark the world’s
nations agreement to cooperate towards a sustainable future.
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Figure 1.1: Agent-environment interface
However, it remains a political challenge whether countries will actually meet the
set targets. Increasing political polarization (Dunlap et al., 2016) makes the question
arise how stable these cooperation agreements actually are.
Social-ecological systems. For such collective efforts to cooperate towards a sus-
tainable future it is important to not treat ecological or social systems as isolated,
but acknowledge them as coupled complex adaptive social-ecological systems (Berkes
and Folke, 1998; Levin et al., 2012). Especially in the last century, human activities
have changed the relationship between societies and the environment up to the global
scale (Crutzen, 2002; Steffen et al., 2007), making them mutually interdependent
and the quest for understanding their joint dynamics urgent. Social-ecological sys-
tem dynamics result from feedback loops involving human behavior, institutional
and biophysical processes. Hence, these often non-linear dynamics involve tipping
elements (Lenton et al., 2008; Schellnhuber, 2009), regime shifts (Lade et al., 2013;
Scheffer et al., 2001), and multi-stabilities (Donges et al., 2017), as well as multiple
kinds of uncertainties (Anderies et al., 2007; Irwin et al., 2016; Polasky et al., 2011a),
and extreme events (Farmer et al., 2015).
These feedback effects bring into question what preconditions are required such that
collective action towards sustainability can succeed. From a conceptual, mathematical
modelers perspective, this raises the more fundamental question, how to formally
understand social-ecological systems in order to investigate these preconditions for
cooperation in social-ecological systems.
1.2 The agent-environment interface
The overall aim of this thesis is to propose the agent-environment interface as known
from e.g. Sutton and Barto (1998) as a formal mathematical framework upon which
social-ecological system models can be build. As such, it remains a proposal that
has to prove its usefulness in the concrete applications dealt with in this thesis.
2
1.2 The agent-environment interface
The key feature of the agent-environment interface (Fig. 1.1) is the clear separation
of agents and environment. The concept of an agent is to be understood as an
abstraction of any real-world entity that acts, i.e. chooses an action from its given
action set. An agent can be a model of e.g. a human individual, a government, a firm,
an organization, a city, etc., as the model designer desires. The environment is to be
understood as the model parts that are not acting. Thus, it must not necessarily be
composed of purely ecological model parts, as the name environment might suggest.
Mathematically, it consists of a set of states, which may change probabilistically,
depending on the agents’ actions. Generally, agents are able to observe environmental
states and other agents. They also receive a reward signal from the environment,
which may depend on the joint action of the agents and the current state transition
of the environment. Thus, agents generally gain rewards from the environment and
from other agents. A more formal presentation of multi-agent environment systems
based on the agent-environment interface principle will be given in Chapter 3.
Why does the agent-environment interface promise to be a useful tool for social-
ecological systems modeling? The agent-environment interface offers a unifying
perspective in the following sense: It is a mathematical design principle which occurs
in many scientific fields. These occurrences allow fruitful connections between social-
ecological systems research and those disciplines. Artificial intelligence research
and reinforcement learning (Busoniu et al., 2008; Sutton and Barto, 1998), Markov
decision processes (Puterman, 2005), optimal (Kirk, 2012), robust (Zhou and Doyle,
1998), viable (Aubin et al., 2011) control theory and cybernetics (Wiener, 1961), all
use some form of an agent-environment interface, likewise does game theory, e.g. in
evolutionary game theory (Perc et al., 2013; Perc and Szolnoki, 2010), the theory of
learning in games (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998), and the theory of stochastic games
(Neyman and Sorin, 2003; Shapley, 1953). Psychology and neuroscience are connected
to the agent-environment interface via artificial intelligence research and reinforcement
learning (Hassabis et al., 2017; Shah, 2012). Further, the majority of behavioral
economic experiments is based on some form of a mathematical game and thereby
also using an agent-environment interface (Camerer et al., 2004). The framework
proposed by Schlüter et al. (2017) for mapping and comparing behavioral theories in
models of social-ecological systems also uses an agent-environment interface, through
which connections to social science theory can be drawn. Naturally, all these fields
have developed their own unique perspective, including assumptions, terminology
and notation, to serve their specific individual research questions. The interested
reader is referred to the works of Shoham and Leyton-Brown (2008) and Gintis (2014)
for more elaborate presentations towards a unified perspective.
The agent-environment interface is a simple and concrete design principle, upon
which social-ecological system models can be build. Unlike less formalized theo-
rizations of social-ecological systems e.g. by Bodin and Tengö (2012), Hinkel et al.
(2014), and Ostrom (2007, 2009) social-ecological systems modeled through the agent-
3
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environment interface can be easily put into mathematical practice. It thus gives one
concrete answer to the question on how to mathematically model social-ecological
systems (van Vuuren et al., 2016; Verburg et al., 2016). Nevertheless, it can be of
great interest to make these less formalized social-ecological systems frameworks
mathematically operationalizable as well (see e.g. Leslie et al., 2015).
Social-ecological systems research, in a broad sense, has already begun to utilize
the agent-environment interface as its basic mathematical framework, e.g. with
cybernetics (Schellnhuber, 1998), Markov decision processes (Chadès et al., 2016),
robust control (Anderies et al., 2007; Rodriguez et al., 2010), viability theory (Heitzig
et al., 2016; Martinet and Doyen, 2007), intelligent decision making and learning
dynamics (Lindkvist and Norberg, 2014; Lindkvist et al., 2017; von der Osten, 2017)
or behavioral experiments (Lindahl et al., 2016; Schill et al., 2015).
1.3 Overview and outline
From social to social-ecological physics. This thesis is a physicist’s contribution to
deepen the theoretical, conceptual understanding of coupled social-ecological systems
by the means of mathematical models.
The idea of applying physics methods to social phenomena dates back centuries
(Stauffer, 2012). While statistical physics applies the laws of statistics together with
assumptions suitable for physics models, sociophysics uses similar methods for social
models. Throwing a coin once, one cannot predict the side it falls upon. Asking one
person how they voted cannot predict the outcome of an election. Yet, throwing
many coins or asking many people can get one closer to an answer (Stauffer, 2012).
In particular, methods of statistical physics have proven to be valuable for studying
the evolution of cooperation in social dilemma games (Perc et al., 2017). Here,
especially the mechanism of network reciprocity (Nowak, 2006) has been a main
driver for the involvement of statistical physics methods. Thus, it is well known that
the structure of a network can significantly affect evolutionary outcomes (Perc and
Szolnoki, 2010).
As the community is self-critically aware, efforts to become more empirically
grounded is of crucial importance to establish the contribution of physicists to social
dynamics (Castellano et al., 2009; Sánchez, 2018). Sánchez (2018) here suggests the
equivalence of physics experiments to experiments of behavioral economics (Camerer
et al., 2004). In those, a number of human subjects are asked to play the game of
interest under various conditions. This kind of empirical research has already been
influential regarding future directions for social physics (Capraro and Perc, 2018).
As Tavoni and Levin (2014) argue, a multidisciplinary approach is needed in order
to tackle the increasingly pressing and intertwined environmental challenges faced by
modern societies, this work is a physicist’s contribution to this realm, thereby in turn
contributing to the increasing multidisciplinarity of physics (Sinatra et al., 2015).
This thesis aims to deepen the conceptual understanding of social-ecological
systems. Guided by the design principle of the agent-environment interface it extends
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the concept of a social dilemma to a social-ecological dilemma. While social dilemmas
have often been studied by evolutionary dynamics in repeated games, this thesis
studies social-ecological dilemmas using so-called stochastic games. Stochastic games
generalize repeated games by having an environment with multiple states, which
can influence the agents’ payoffs. This kind of extension results directly from the
design principle of the agent-environment interface which makes the environment
explicitly visible. Instead of evolutionary dynamics of populations this thesis focuses
on learning dynamics of agents. However, both are structurally very similar, as
argued in Chapter 4. Doing so, this thesis extends the domain of social physics to
social-ecological physics.
Outline. This dissertation can be regarded as a story in three acts preceded by a
prologue and a foundational chapter.
Chapter 2 is a prologue to the agent-environment interface. It presents a social
learning network model of private renewable resource harvesting, which was not
designed explicitly based on an agent-environment interface. Doing so, this chapter
highlights the existence of different model design principles, of which all can be
useful, depending on the questions asked. Yet, it may be difficult to reconcile them
afterwards.
Chapter 3 introduces the conceptual and mathematical foundations of a special
case of a multi-agent environment system, based on the agent-environment interface.
The remainder of this thesis will utilize this special case, focusing on systems with
finite action and state sets, as well as discrete update times.
The first act (Chapter 4) refines techniques from the statistical physics literature on
learning dynamics to derive a deterministic limit of established reinforcement learning
algorithms from artificial intelligence research. This is a necessary methodological
extension, in order to enable a dynamical systems perspective on coupled social-
ecological dilemmas in stochastic games with multiple environmental states, since
the majority of previously used evolutionary dynamics are not able to deal with such
environments. This chapter demonstrates the potential of this method with the three
well established learning algorithms Q learning, SARSA learning and Actor-Critic
learning. Illustrations of their dynamics on multi-agent, multi-state environments
reveal a wide range of different dynamical regimes, such as convergence to fixed
points, limit cycles and even deterministic chaos.
The second act (Chapter 5) applies the derived multi-state learning equations to a
particular, newly introduced environment, termed the Ecological Public Good. It
models a coupled social-ecological dilemma, extending established repeated social
dilemma games, such as the Prisoner’s dilemma, by an ecological tipping element.
Both, the preconditions for the emergence and stability of cooperation are examined
by a combination of numerical and analytical methods. This model is able to explain
empirical observations and reproduce known theoretical results. Novel qualitatively
different parameter regimes are discovered, among those one, in which agents prefer to
collectively suffer in environmental collapse, rather than cooperating in a prosperous
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environment. With respect to the stability of cooperation it can be shown that
cooperation can remain stable despite considerable shortsightedness. However, this
is only the case if the expected damage in the case of collapse is large. Conversely,
these reward optimizing learners who do not believe in likely and severe consequences
of a tipping catastrophe will break off the cooperation agreement.
The final act of this thesis (Chapter 6) challenges the reward optimizing paradigm
of the learning equations, since also in other contexts of environmental governance
optimization approaches have been criticized. Prominent alternatives to the decision
paradigm of economic optimization are sustainability and the safe operating space.
These three decision paradigms are systematically compared when applied for the
management of a single-agent tipping element environment, which can be regarded
as a single-agent version of the Ecological Public Good as introduced in Chapter 5.
This chapter shows that optimization alone can lead to safe and sustainable behavior,
but is by no means guaranteed to do so. In fact, no paradigm guarantees fulfilling
requirements imposed by another paradigm. The absence of such a master paradigm
is shown to be of special relevance for governing the climate system, which may
reside at the edge between parameter regimes where economic welfare optimization
becomes neither sustainable nor safe.
Chapter 7 concludes this thesis by summarizing its contributions and an outlook
for future research.
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Chapter 2
Prologue: Networked social learning of
private renewable resource use
Der Menschenfreund im Bund mit aller Menschheit Feinde.
Hans Wurst - from Paul Dessau’s Einstein: Prologue
This chapter examines the preconditions for sustainable harvesting of private
renewable resources within a networked social learning model. Since this model
was originally not designed above an agent-environment interface, it presents an
interesting case to be compared to this design principle. While analyzing the
presented network model, this chapter thereby highlights the existence of different
model design principles for social-ecological systems modeling, of which all can be
valuable. However, different model designs might be difficult to be reconciled in
retrospect.
This chapter is primarily based on (Barfuss et al., 2017, P1). The comparison
with the agent-environment interface (Sec. 2.4) is new material.
2.1 Introduction
Whether, when and how human usage of biophysical resources meets limits that
produce feedbacks onto social functioning has a long history of controversial discussion
(Malthus, 1798; Meadows et al., 1972; Rockström et al., 2009a). Especially in the
last century, human activities have changed the relationship between nature and
society at the global scale (Crutzen, 2002; Steffen et al., 2007, 2015b), making them
mutually interdependent in an unprecedented manner and the question of their joint
dynamics urgent. Social and ecological systems should therefore be studied not only
in isolation but also as interlinked social-ecological systems (Berkes and Folke, 1998).
This chapter contributes to this debate by investigating properties of a stylized
social system that cause the linked resource use system to either collapse or remain
viable. Such a perspective also has important implications for the mathematical
modeling of interdependent, global human-environment interactions (van Vuuren
et al., 2016; Verburg et al., 2016). Typically, in present-day analysis the Earth system
is either modeled from a purely biophysical point of view (Claussen et al., 2002) or
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from a biophysical-economic one (van Vuuren et al., 2012), depending on the scope
of the research question. However, both approaches do not take into account social
dynamics beyond macroeconomic paradigms.
In this regard, the aim of this chapter is to conceptually explore avenues for a third
strand of global modeling, next to the biophysical and biophysical-economic one,
incorporating also social-cultural dynamics (c.f. Donges et al., 2018, P6). Rooted
in a genuinely social-ecological perspective, the naming World-Earth system models
emphasizes the free coevolution of the social and ecological components (Schellnhuber,
1998, 1999). While sophisticated models of this type are not yet available, the
literature contains various modeling studies that incorporate potentially important
features such as static interaction networks (Chung et al., 2013; Sugiarto et al.,
2015) to depict stylized social dynamics (Auer et al., 2015; Holme and Newman,
2006), tele-coupling effects in a globalized society interacting through social networks
(Bodin and Tengö, 2012; Janssen et al., 2006), social-ecological regime shifts (Lade
et al., 2013; Scheffer et al., 2001) and (social) tipping elements (Bentley et al., 2014;
Schellnhuber, 2009), structural re-organization occurring on adaptive social networks
(Gross and Blasius, 2008; Sayama et al., 2013; Schleussner et al., 2016; Snijders
et al., 2010) or structural transformations (Lade et al., 2017) and cultural preference
dynamics due to traits such as imitation (Traulsen et al., 2010) or homophily (Centola
et al., 2007; McPherson et al., 2001).
Section 2.2 sets out a mathematical model to demonstrate that social network
interactions, imitation and homophily may have a profound influence on the en-
vironmental state, such as determining whether a collection of private renewable
resources collapses from overuse or not. This chapter argues that more elaborate and
sophisticated implementations of such social phenomena should receive attention in
the future development of global system models, supplementing already established
Earth system and integrated assessment models, neither of which at present include
them.
As a particular case study for this chapter’s model the effect of heterogeneously
distributed resources is being investigated. This is important since in the real world
actors do have access to different amounts of biophysical resources. This chapter
examines under which combinations of parameters, characterizing a social learning
network process, the model converges to a sustainable regime for different degrees of
resource access heterogeneity. Parameters governing social learning dynamics are
on the one hand a homophily parameter ϕ, addressing the propensity of nodes to
establish interactions with nodes of the same kind (see Sec. 2.2 for a detailed model
description). On the other hand, the timescale of social interaction τ quantifies the
average time for social updates on the network. In this model, agents deliberately
employ no form of individual learning with regard to the optimal harvesting strategy
to emphasize the effects of the described social learning process. Individual learning
will be explored in Chapters 4 and 5. Already for homogeneous resource access
(Wiedermann et al., 2015) one observes a threshold in the parameter space of the
model from non-sustainable to sustainable regimes at certain critical values ϕc and
τc.
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Since the concrete heterogeneous resource distribution is often unknown, the
effect of its heterogeneity on the critical transition parameters ϕc and τc will be
systematically investigated. It turns out that a heavy-tailed in comparison to a
non-heavy-tailed resource distribution changes the model’s behavior considerably.
This is important as real-world resource data suggests that access to biophysical
resources may indeed be distributed with heavy-tails.
Sec. 2.2 introduces the networked social learning model of private renewable
resource harvesting and presents empirical data of heterogeneous resource access.
While Sec. 2.3 discusses the results of this model study Sec. 2.4 discusses its model
design with respect to the agent-environment interface. A summary closes this
chapter in Sec. 2.5.
2.2 Model and methods
The model design is intended to conceptually explore the coevolution of socio-cultural
with ecological dynamics and not to follow any specific real-world setting. On a
conceptual level, human-environment interactions can happen in a common- or
private-pools setting. Common-pool dilemmas have been studied extensively in
the past (e.g. Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 2015; Tavoni et al., 2012). Here, agents can
retrieve information on other agent’s harvesting strategy either via the ecological
subsystem, i.e. the common-pool itself or via purely social interactions. In order to
specifically focus on the latter of the two processes no transfer of information via
the ecological system takes place. Thus, this model discards a common-pool setting
in favor of individual and private resource stocks per agent. Wiedermann et al.
(2015) introduced a model for such a setting for the special case of homogeneously
distributed private resources. They showed distinct regimes in its parameter space,
and provided analytical approximations of its dynamics. Here, this setting is refined
for the more general case of an inhomogeneous resource distribution. Fig. 2.1 presents
an overview of the model.
2.2.1 A stylized anthroposphere
The social learning (Bandura, 1977) process takes place in a network initialized as
a random graph G (Erdös and Rényi, 1960) with nodes labeled by integer number
i = 1, . . . , N , representing social agents. It is based on two theoretical paradigms:
(i) Agents either change their strategy through imitation (Bahar et al., 2014;
Traulsen et al., 2010) or
(ii) adapt their local network structure by rewiring to other nodes with similar
behavior (homophily, Centola et al., 2007; McPherson et al., 2001).
In order to integrate this discrete update process (Holme and Newman, 2006;
Zanette and Gil, 2006) with the continuous evolution of the resource stocks, social
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Figure 2.1: Model illustration. As the ecological sub-process the agents harvest their private
logistically growing renewable resource with either a sustainable (green) or non-sustainable
(purple) strategy. The social sub-process follows the logics of strategy imitation due to
comparisons of harvest rates and of social network adaptation due to homophily. The social
update times are generated by a Poisson process with average inter-event time τ .
update times ti are assigned to the agents as generated by a Poisson process with an
exponential distribution
p(∆ti; τ) = 1
τ
exp
(
−∆ti
τ
)
(2.1)
of waiting times ∆ti, where the parameter τ gives the expected waiting time.
Thus, agent i with the lowest update time in the queue performs the social update
process according to:
(1) if the degree of agent i is zero (i.e. i has no neighbors), do nothing, otherwise
choose a neighbor j of i at random.
(2) If j and i employ the same harvesting strategy Si = Sj (either sustainable or
non-sustainable, see below), do nothing. Otherwise,
(2.1) with rewiring probability ϕ disconnect j from i and connect i to a randomly
chosen agent k that employs the same strategy.
(2.2) If (2.1) was not chosen, change the strategy of i to the one of j according to
the sigmoidal imitation probability function
P (Si → Sj) = 12
(
tanh
(
λ
[
hj(t)− hi(t)
])
+ 1
)
. (2.2)
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Hence, the greater the harvest rate hj (see below) of agent j with respect to the
harvest rate hi of agent i, the more likely agent i is to change its strategy to
the one of agent j. Agents only consider their current yields when formulating
their next harvesting strategy. This assumption reflects the agent’s limited
knowledge of their own and their neighbors’ ecosystems. The parameter λ
controls the slope of the imitation probability function (Eq. (2.2)), i.e. for
λ→∞ agent i would always imitate agent j’s strategy if hj(t) > hi(t), while
for λ → 0 the imitation probability tends to 1/2 and is independent of the
agents’ harvest rates. Therefore, one can interpret λ as imitation tendency
parameter. Traulsen et al. (2010) found this sigmoidal shape of imitation
probability in a behavioral experiment.
(3) For the next update, another waiting time is drawn from the exponential
distribution (Eq. 2.1) and added to the update time of agent i.
2.2.2 A stylized ecosphere
Private resource dynamics
The model’s ecological module consists of private renewable resources each following
a logistic growth function, which is chosen as one of the simplest and most commonly
used models of renewable resource dynamics in a constrained environment (Brander
and Taylor, 1998; Keeling, 2000; Perman et al., 2003). Additionally, a harvest rate
hi = Eisi is subtracted from the rate of change of the resource stock si. Ei denotes
the effort of agent i. Thus, the dynamics of the ith resource is given by
dsi
dt
= gi
(
1− s
i
Ci
)
si − Eisi. (2.3)
Here, gi denotes the growth rate and Ci the carrying capacity of the ith resource
stock. The strategy Si of agent i can either be sustainable (Si = 1), resulting in an
effort Eis = g
i
2 . Otherwise Si is non-sustainable (Si = 0) with an effort Ein =
3gi
2 .
These efforts have been chosen such that the sustainable strategy coincides with
the maximum sustainable yield, whereas the non-sustainable strategy leads to the
full depletion of the resource stock and, consequently, no harvest at all in the long
term. Note that Ein and Eis are symmetrically separated from the critical effort
Eic = gi. The latter is defined such that for positive efforts below Eic the resource
stock converges to a non-zero stationary state, whereas for efforts above Eic the
resource stock collapses and converges to zero. When in interplay with the social
update process, Eq. 2.3 is used as its analytically derived definite integral, which
circumvents the need of any numerical integration methods.
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Resource heterogeneity
Heterogeneous access to resources is operationalized by randomly distributing the
resource capacities Ci according to a prescribed probability density function. For
this purpose, the log-normal distribution
lnN (C;µ, σ) = 1
Cσ
√
2π
exp
[
−(lnC − µ)
2
2σ2
]
, C > 0, (2.4)
is used, with parameters µ and σ (not to be confused with the standard deviation of
C). It derives from the normal distribution: a positive random variable is log-normally
distributed if its logarithm is normally distributed. The log-normal distribution is
therefore applicable for positive valued quantities and has a heavy tail. σ and µ are
the standard deviation and the mean of the logarithmic variable lnC, respectively.
The log-normal distribution occurs in variables from many fields, including biological
and economic attributes (Sachs, 1984).
Fig. 2.2 shows exemplary empirical distributions of three different types of resources
to illustrate that real-world resource data can be qualitatively described by a log-
normal distribution with least square fits revealing different σ parameters:
(i) biocapacity1 per country (σ = 1.42) computed from the Ecological Footprint
Network (Ewing et al., 2008) representing the capacity of ecosystems to regen-
erate what people extract,
(ii) total renewable water resources data2 (σ = 1.98) characterizing the maximum
yearly amount of water available to each country for the year 2012, and
(iii) forested land area3 per country (σ = 3.83) for the year 1991.
Although the agreement between the log-normal distribution and the data is far from
perfect, Fig. 2.2 supports the use of a log-normal model for resource heterogeneity in
this chapter’s stylized social-ecological system model.
This distribution is utilized to investigate how resource heterogeneity affects the
behavior of the model in comparison to the frequently studied homogeneous case.
To study only the effect of different resource distributions and keep the total amount
of available resource stock constant the parameter µ was adjusted according to
µ(σ) = −σ2/2, resulting in a fixed value for ⟨C⟩ = 1, the mean of the carrying
capacities.
1downloaded at http://www.footprintnetwork.org/images/uploads/NFA_2010_Results.xls on
October 14, 2014
2downloaded at http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/data/query/index.html?lang=en on
November 25, 2015
3downloaded at http://faostat3.fao.org/download/R/RL/E on November 24, 2015
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Figure 2.2: Empirical resource data per country normalized to the respective average (dots)
together with least-square fitted log-normal distributions (lines): The biocapacity (σ = 1.42)
computed from the Ecological Footprint Network (Ewing et al., 2008) represents the capacity
of ecosystems to regenerate what people demand from them for the year 2007; the total
renewable water resources (σ = 1.98) corresponds to the maximum theoretical yearly amount
of water actually available for a country for the year 2012; forest land area per country
(σ = 3.83) for the year 1991. The data are normalized to yield the same parameter µ = 0 of
the log-normal distribution. Note that the data qualitatively fits the log-normal distribution
and that they give different values for the σ parameters of the log-normal distribution.
For comparison, results for non-heavy tailed resource capacities
C = |Ctmp|
where Ctmp ∼ N (Ctmp;µN , σN ) = 1
σN
√
2π
exp
[
−(Ctmp − µN )
2
2σ2N
]
(2.5)
are also presented, where µN denotes the mean and σN the standard deviation of
the underlying normal distribution. The resource heterogeneity σN is systematically
varied on comparable ranges of variances for both - normal and log-normal - distri-
butions, while the mean is also kept fixed (µN = 1). Since the normal distribution is
not bounded by positive values, the absolute value of the drawn random variable is
used.
2.2.3 Model parameterization and simulation protocol
A model run starts with an initial condition of stocks si(0) uniformly distributed
between 0 and Ci and harvesting strategies Si(0) drawn with a probability of 0.5 for
a sustainable strategy Si = 1 or a non-sustainable strategy Si = 0. From the initial
conditions, the model will converge to the steady state at tf , where no further updates
of strategy can occur. This is the case because the social network will consist solely
of disconnected components with only one harvesting strategy (including the case of
one single component) (Wiedermann et al., 2015). The remaining model parameters
are the number of nodes N = 500, mean degree k¯ = 20, imitation tendency λ = 1
and ecological growth rate gi = 1 for i = 1, . . . , N which are kept fixed throughout
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the analysis. To account for the stochasticity inherent in the model, R = 250 runs
for each parameter setting of interest were performed. The main observable is the
fraction of sustainable harvesting nodes at the steady state
⟨S(tf )⟩N,R =
⟨
1
N
N∑
i=1
Si(tf )
⟩
R
(2.6)
averaged over all ensemble runs R. ⟨S(tf )⟩N,R is bounded between one and zero
where ⟨S(tf )⟩N,R = 1(0) denotes a completely (non-)sustainable regime.
2.3 Discussion of results
2.3.1 Social interaction timescale–homophily parameter space
Figure 2.3: Social interaction timescale–homophily parameter space. Average fraction of
sustainable harvesting agents in the steady state depending on the social network rewiring
probability ϕ (measuring the degree of homophily) and the social interaction timescale τ
for four distinct levels of resource heterogeneity: (a) σ = 0.01; (b) σ = 0.6; (c) σ = 0.9;
(d) σ = 1.2. One observes four qualitatively different regimes: i) the sustainable regime for
ϕ ≲ 0.8 and sufficiently large (slow) τ in green, ii) the non-sustainable or collapse regime for
ϕ ≲ 0.8 and sufficiently small (fast) τ in purple, iii) in between both the transition regime in
white as well as iv) the network fragmentation regime for ϕ ≳ 0.8.
First, the effect of the rewiring probability ϕ (as a measure of the degree of
homophily) and the average social interaction timescale τ on the fraction of sustainable
harvesting nodes at the steady state ⟨S(tf )⟩N,R (Eq. (2.6)) is investigated for
vanishing resource heterogeneity (σ = 0.01) (Fig. 2.3 a).
Four regimes. Four qualitatively different regimes can be observed: the sustainable
regime in green, the non-sustainable or collapse regime in purple, in between the
transition regime in white and the network fragmentation regime for sufficiently large
ϕ. The latter occurs since for large ϕ, social dynamics are dominated by homophily
and, hence, by the process of social network rewiring, and thus negligibly few changes
in strategy occur. The steady state is reached by a fragmentation of the network into
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at least one purely sustainable and at least one purely non-sustainable component of
comparable size. In turn, for smaller ϕ the effect of homophily is sufficiently weak
such that most agents remain connected to a single component in the social network.
The steady state is reached with a big connected network component. Here, large
interaction timescales τ lead to a sustainable regime. This is because the comparisons
of harvest rates typically happen when the logistic resource has been harvested for a
sufficiently long time to reveal that the harvest rate converges to a positive value for
a sustainable strategy whereas for a non-sustainable strategy it converges to zero.
Timescales. With respect to the timescale of social updates τ , it has been sug-
gested that modern lifestyles are dominated by a social acceleration (Rosa, 2013).
Simultaneously the pressure humanity is putting on the planet (Steffen et al., 2005)
has experienced a great acceleration (Steffen et al., 2015b), threatening the Earth’s
ecosystems. Thus, a faster social timescales τ may lead to a non-sustainable regime,
as observed in our model (see Fig. 2.3). Viewed with caution, the mechanisms
in our model might be a possible explanation of this phenomenon. In any case, it
highlights the importance of well synchronized social with ecological timescales. Since
ecological timescales (e.g. the seasonal cycle) are difficult to influence, this suggests
to take social timescales (e.g. election cycles, fashion trends, product launches) into
account for possible policy interventions. As such it might be worthwhile to study
the relationship between social and ecological timescales more intensively to identify
suitable policy actions for the benefit of a sustainable system.
Homophily. Further, one can observe a linear relationship between critical parame-
ters ϕc and τc where the transition between collapse and sustainable regimes occurs
(Fig. 2.3). This result can be explained by the rate at which strategy changes happen.
For ϕ = 0, the transition occurs at 1/τ ≈ 1, i.e. the ecological growth rate. For
ϕ > 0, imitation interactions happen at a rate (1− ϕ)/τ (Wiedermann et al., 2015)
since the network rewires with probability ϕ and, hence, imitation takes place with
probability 1− ϕ. Hence, the effective imitation rate (1− ϕ)/τ equals approx. 1 (the
ecological growth rate) in the transition regime, which explains the linear dependence
between the two social parameters.
In other words, the homophily process in our model is beneficial for reaching the
sustainable regime, where all agents harvest their resource gaining the maximum
sustainable yield. All stochasticity and inherent shocks towards this sustainable
steady state are absorbed. In this sense the sustainable regime can be described as
resilient. This aligns with previous findings from Newig et al. (2010), who hypothesize
that homophily has a beneficial effect on the resilience of a social-ecological network.
Furthermore, one can interpret a large homophily parameter ϕ as the agent’s means
to protect themselves against the fast and free exchange of harvesting strategies.
Along similar lines, it has been found that individuals with more environmental
concerns hold also more protectionist policy preferences (Bechtel et al., 2012). This
model suggests one possible mechanism how these relationships might come into
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place. However, it remains to remark that a too large rewiring probability leads
to a fragmentation of the social network into smaller groups of disjoint strategies,
preventing the opportunity of a completely sustainable outcome. Thus, network
adaptation at very high rates should be avoided for the sake of knowledge exchange
and sustainable consensus formation.
Overall, these results demonstrate that immaterial processes distinct from
macroeconomic optimization paradigms and residing exclusively in the social sphere,
such as homophily and imitation, are capable of determining the eventual state
of a material renewable resource. Thereby, these processes are able to govern a
coupled social-ecological system such that full sustainability and total collapse are
possible outcomes within the investigated social parameter space. Additionally, they
show how the interaction of different social processes such as strategy imitation and
homophily is able to shape the sustainable regime. This suggests that social-cultural
processes should be considered as a potentially important part of feedback loops also
in more elaborate models of the World-Earth system.
2.3.2 Systematic analysis of resource heterogeneity
Next, the effect of the resource heterogeneity σ on the transition regime between
sustainable and non-sustainable steady states is investigated. The panels in Fig. 2.3
a-d show a qualitatively similar structure of parameter space for varying degrees of
resource heterogeneity, yet with decreasing extent of the non-sustainable regime for
increasing σ.
A more systematic analysis examines the average fraction of sustainable harvesting
nodes at the consensus state ⟨S(tf )⟩N,R for several segments of the parameter space
spanned by τ , ϕ and the resource heterogeneity parameters σ (σN ), i.e. results are
shown for both log-normally and normally distributed resource carrying capacities
(Fig. 2.4). The ranges of σ for the log-normal and σN for the normal distribution
are chosen such that they correspond to comparable standard deviations.
This analysis allows to explicitly show the effect of resource heterogeneity on the
critical values τc (Fig. 2.4 a,c) and ϕc (Fig. 2.4 b,d), where the transition between
the non-sustainable to the sustainable regime occurs. In general, the larger σ (σN )
the smaller τc and ϕc. In other words, a sustainable steady state can be achieved for
faster social interactions and smaller degrees of homophily, the larger the resource
heterogeneity is. The critical effective update timescale τ/(1−ϕ) != τeff,crit decreases to
faster update times. This behavior is more pronounced for the log-normal distribution
(Fig. 2.4a,b) than for the normal one (Fig. 2.4c,d) and can be explained by the heavy
tails of the log-normal distribution. For a sufficiently large resource heterogeneity σ
there is a sufficiently high probability that some agents will be assigned a comparably
large resource capacity. Non-sustainable harvesting agents exploit their resources
exponentially fast in time, whereas sustainable harvesting agents with comparably
large resource capacity can retain their resource stock at a level that is still sufficiently
large to convince other agents to become sustainable as well.
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Figure 2.4: Effects of resource heterogeneity. Average fraction of sustainable harvesting
nodes at the steady state for several segments of parameter space: (a,b) for (heavy-tailed) log-
normally distributed capacities, and (c,d) for (non-heavy-tailed) normally distributed capacities.
Parameter spaces spanned by social interaction timescale τ and resource heterogeneity σ
(σN ) for rewiring probability ϕ = 0 (a,c), and by ϕ and σ (σN ) for τ = 0.5 (b,d). The
ranges of σ and σN were chosen such that the standard deviations of both distributions are
comparable. For both distributions, the mean was fixed to 1. The dashed black lines indicate
the linearly interpolated 50% average fraction of sustainable nodes. Note the considerable
effect the log-normal resource capacity distribution (in comparison to the normal distribution)
has on the critical values of τ and ϕ, where the transition between the sustainable and the
non-sustainable regime occurs.
At first, the observation that heterogeneity in the access to the private resources
is enlarging the sustainable regime might be contradictory to one’s intuition. This
demonstrates the value of a thorough system’s analysis and being critical about
the own intuition. Cautiously comparing this phenomenon with the real-world one
can interpret the size of the resource capacity as the effective economic power of
international macro-agents, such as world-regions or nation states. This is justified,
since no other economic processes are modeled but resource extraction; such as
trade, innovation, labor, etc. The agents with comparably large economic power
that employ a sustainable strategy have greater persuasive power than sustainable
agents with smaller economic power. A country’s energy transition to sustainable
energy supply and its perceived impact on other countries might be a real-world
example where a comparably strong economic country can exert also comparable
large persuasive power to other countries to move forward towards sustainable energy
supply.
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Overall, heterogeneity to resource access in this model demonstrates, how compa-
rably few sustainable first-movers with a large resource capacity are able to shift the
overall system toward a sustainable state also at fast social interaction rates.
2.4 Discussion of model design
The design of this chapter’s model represents an interesting case to be discussed with
respect to the agent-environment interface. Although one can talk about agents in
this model, it was not designed above such an interface. Such model designs follow a
clear separation between agents (with actions, observations and rewards) and the
environment (with states and dynamics between states). See Sec.1.2 for a more
extensive discussion of the agent-environment interface and its advantages.
Nevertheless, one can reconstruct an agent-environment interface for this chapter’s
model in retrospect. In fact, various possibilities are conceivable (see below), and
hence no clear agent-environment interface exists.
To reconstruct an agent-environment interface, the agents’ actions and observations,
as well as the rewards and environmental states have to be identified in line with the
model’s dynamics. To illustrate that various interfaces exist, highlighting possible
choices of only the agents’ action set is sufficient. One choice could be
A = {rewire, change harvesting strategy, do nothing}.
Here, agents can only choose to either rewire, change their harvesting strategy or do
neither of both. With this action set, the current harvesting strategy becomes part
of the environmental state space. The agents have agency to either change or stay
with their current harvesting strategy.
One might object, why should the agents not be able to simultaneously change
their harvesting strategy and rewire. This combination would not be possible with
the action set above. Yet, with an action set
A = {rewire, not rewire} × {harvest with low effort, harvest with high effort}
= {rewire and harvest with low effort, rewire and harvest with high effort,
not rewire and harvest with low effort,
not rewire and harvest with high effort}
simultaneously rewiring and changing the harvesting strategy would be possible.
The circumstance that agents in this chapter’s model in fact do not do both action
processes simultaneously can be reflected in corresponding agent dynamics and does
not mean that the underlying action set does not offer this choice. Additionally, this
action set differs from the first one with respect to the harvesting strategies. Here,
sustainable and non-sustainable harvesting are direct action processes. In the first
example, the harvesting strategy was part of the environmental state set and the
action was to change these states.
18
2.5 Summary
For both action set choices, if an agent chooses to rewire, the environment redis-
tributes the agent to a new neighbor. Agents have no agency to which other agent
they form a connection. This means, that the model assumption of homophily is no
choice by the agents, but happens exclusively through the environment.
If the model designer wants to give the agents a choice to which other agent they
form a connection,
A = {rewire from neighbor j to node k | j ∈ agent’s neighbors, k ∈ {1, . . . , N},
not rewire}
× {harvest with low effort, harvest with high effort}.
is a possible action set. If agents rewire, they choose which tie they break and which
new tie they form. However, to reconcile the model’s social dynamics, this action
set would require that agents are able to observe the harvesting strategy of all other
agents. These were only three possibilities. Further variants of the underlying agents’
action sets could be easily constructed.
Model designs according to the agent-environment interface lead to a focus on
individual agent behaviors and their emergent properties, resulting from the interplay
between other agents and the environment. The advantage of the agent-environment
interface design is that agent techniques, such a reinforcement learning (Chapter
4) or decision paradigms (Chapter 6) can be generally defined without a concrete
environment in mind. However, these techniques require a distinct action set.
Designs such a the one of this chapter’s model on the other hand, can be viewed
from the perspective of social processes. Within the model, these social processes
happen without the need to result from individual actions. Thus, this perspective
does not require a clear separation between agents and environments.
Overall, it is important to acknowledge that both model design principles exist
and that both are useful for answering research questions. Yet, it may be difficult to
reconcile these both approaches after models have been constructed.
2.5 Summary
This chapter has investigated how social-ecological thresholds between sustainable and
non-sustainable resource-use regimes depend on networked social learning interactions
under conditions of resource heterogeneity. It used a stylized model of networked
agents harvesting private renewable resources with either a sustainable or non-
sustainable strategy. The strategies employed by the agents are updated through a
social learning process on an adaptive social network reflecting an interconnected
society. Resource heterogeneity was operationalized by log-normally and normally
distributed carrying capacities of the resources.
It was shown that the properties of social processes such as strategy formation
through imitation and homophilic social network adaptation alone can precondition
the long-term state of renewable resources with outcomes ranging from environmental
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collapse to sustainability. This observation suggests that a purely economic rationale
may neglect decisive processes when modeling coupled social-ecological systems.
It suggests that more sophisticated models of global coupled human-environment
systems need to consider socio-cultural feedbacks as well (see also Donges et al., 2018,
P6).
Furthermore, it was demonstrated that resource heterogeneities are important
model ingredients that may not be neglected, especially when resource distributions
possess heavy tails. This is relevant because empirical observations suggest that
access to biophysical resources may indeed follow heavy tailed distributions.
Outlook. Overall, this chapter highlights how socio-cultural (i.e. immaterial) dy-
namics and interactions can have a profound qualitative effect on physical (i.e.
material) states of the environment and, consequently, that neither social processes
nor resource heterogeneities should be neglected a priori in a more sophisticated
modeling of the World-Earth system.
In the context of the ongoing debate on global change (Steffen et al., 2005) and
the Anthropocene (Crutzen, 2002; Steffen et al., 2007, 2015b), such more advanced
models of planetary social-ecological systems (World-Earth models) are needed
for developing a deeper understanding of the dynamics and interrelations between
planetary boundaries (Rockström et al., 2009a; Steffen et al., 2015a) and social
foundations (Raworth, 2012) for guiding humanity to a desirable safe and just
operating space. Donges et al. (2018, P5) make a concrete suggestion for such a
World-Earth modeling framework.
With respect to model design principles, it is important to acknowledge that
different model design principles for social-ecological systems modeling exist. Yet,
models of different designs might be difficult to be reconciled in retrospect. As a
model designer, it is therefore important, to be conscious about the model design
from the beginning.
The next chapter will introduce a variant of the agent-environment interface.
Relevant concepts in sufficient mathematical detail will be given for multi-agent
environment systems with discrete action and state sets as well as discrete update
times. This variant of the agent-environment interface will be used throughout the
rest of this thesis.
Python code of this chapter’s model and scripts for the reproduction of the figures is available at
github: http://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1493202. For illustrative purposes, a netlogo-version can
be downloaded as well: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1494178.
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Multi-agent environment foundations
Ich habe auch ein sogenanntes Hobby, zu deutsch einen
persönlichen Stil.
Krokodil - from Paul Dessau’s Einstein: Intermezzo I
This chapter introduces a particular variant of multi-agent environment systems
following the principle of the agent-environment interface. All following chapters
of this thesis will utilize this variant. It is characterized by discrete action and
environmental state sets, as well as discrete time steps. The environment is Markov,
i.e. transition probabilities only depend on the current state of the environment and
the current actions of the agents. The environment is assumed to be fully observable,
i.e. agents can observe the current true Markov state. Essentially, such a setting
is also known as a Markov or stochastic game (Neyman and Sorin, 2003; Shapley,
1953)
While the content presented in this chapter is known and used in many disciplines,
this chapter’s purpose is to give a common background, introduction of concepts and
notational conventions for the following chapters.
It is based on parts of (Barfuss et al., 2019, P7).
3.1 Agents and the environment
There are N ∈ N agents. The environment can exist in Z ∈ N states S =
{S1, . . . , SZ}. In each state each agent has M ∈ N available actions Ai = {Ai1,
. . . , AiM}, i = 1, . . . , N to choose from. Having an identical number of actions for
all states and all agents is notational convenience, no significant restriction. A joint
action of all agents is referred to by a ∈ A = A1 × · · · × AN , the joint action of all
agents but agent i is denoted by a−i ∈ A−i = A1 × · · · × Ai−1 ×Ai+1 × · · · × AN .
Environmental dynamics are given by the probabilities for state changes expressed
as a transition tensor
T ∈ [0, 1]Z×M×...(N times)...×M×Z . (3.1)
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The entry Tsas′ denotes the probability P (s′|s,a) that the environment transitions
to state s′ given the environment was in state s and the agents have chosen the joint
action a. Hence, for all s,a, ∑s′ Tsas′ = 1 must hold. The assumption that the next
state only depends on the current state and joint action makes this system Markovian.
In this thesis environments are restricted to be ergodic, without absorbing states (c.f.
Hennes et al., 2010).
Rewards. Agent receive rewards, given by the reward tensor
R ∈ RN×Z×M×...(N times)...×M×Z . (3.2)
The entry Risas′ denotes the reward agent i receives when the environment transitions
from state s to state s′ under the joint action a. Rewards are also called payoffs from
a game theoretic perspective.
Behavior. Agents draw their actions from their behavior profile
X ∈ [0, 1]N×Z×M . (3.3)
The entry Xisa = P (a | i, s) denotes the probability that agent i chooses action a in
state s. Thus, for all i and all s, ∑aXisa = 1 must hold.
This thesis focuses on the case of independent agents, able to fully observe the
current state of the environment. With correlated behavior (see e.g. Busoniu et al.,
2008) and partially observable environments (Oliehoek, 2012; Spaan, 2012) one could
extend this multi-agent environment systems framework to be even more general.
Note that the behavior profile is usually called policy from a machine learning
perspective or behavioral strategy from a game theoretic perspective. Policies and
strategies might suggest a deliberate choice by the agents, the term behavior intends to
avoid in the case of learning agents (Chapters 4 and 5). For the case of environmental
governance Chapter 6 will speak of polices instead of behavior.
Fig. 3.1 refines Fig. 1.1 from the Introduction, illustrating this particular multi-
agent environment system.
3.2 Behavioral and environmental averages
To allow a systematic averaging over the current behavior profile X and the environ-
mental transitions T, the following notational convention is introduced. Averaging
over the whole behavioral profile yields
X⟨◦⟩ :=
∑
a
Xsa · ◦
:=
∑
a1∈A1
. . .
∑
aN∈AN
X1sa1 · · ·XNsaN · ◦. (3.4)
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Figure 3.1: Multi-agent environment system. (also known as stochastic or Markov game).
N agents choose a joint action a = (a1, . . . , aN ) from their action sets Ai, based on the
current state of the environment s, according to their behavior profile Xisa = P (a|i, s). This
will change the state of the environment from s to s′ with probability Tsas′ , and provide each
agent with a reward Risas′ .
Here, ◦ serves as a placeholder. If the expression to be inserted for ◦ depends on the
summation indices, then of course, those indices will be summed over as well. If the
expression, which is averaged out, is used in tensor form, it is written in bold. If not,
remaining indices are added after the right angle bracket.
Averaging over the behavioral profile of the other agents, keeping the action of
agent i, yields
X−i⟨◦⟩ :=
∑
a−i
X−i
sa−i · ◦
:=
∑
a1∈A1
. . .
∑
aN∈AN  
excl. i
X1sa1 · · ·XNsaN  
excl. i
· ◦ . (3.5)
Last, averaging over the subsequent state s′ yields
T⟨◦⟩ :=
∑
s′
Tsas′ · ◦ :=
∑
s′∈S
Tsa1...aNs′ · ◦. (3.6)
Of course, these operations may also be combined as TX⟨◦⟩ and TX−i⟨◦⟩, by multi-
plying both summations.
Effective Markov chain. For example, given a behavior profile X, the resulting
effective Markov Chain transition matrix reads X⟨T ⟩ss′ , which encodes the transi-
tion probabilities from state s to s′. From X⟨T ⟩ss′ the stationary distribution of
environmental states σ(X) can be computed. σ(X) is the row (or left) eigenvector
corresponding to the eigenvalue 1 of X⟨T ⟩ss′ . Its entries encode the ratios of the
average durations the agents find themselves in the respective environmental states.
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Agent’s rewards. The average reward agent i receives from state s under action a,
given all other agents follow the behavior profile X reads TX−i⟨R⟩isa. Including agent
i’s behavior profile gives the average reward it receives from state s: TX⟨R⟩is. Hence,
TX⟨R⟩is =
∑
a
Xisa · TX−i⟨R⟩isa (3.7)
holds.
3.3 Agent’s preferences and values
Return. Typically, agents are assumed to maximize their exponentially discounted
sum of future rewards, called return
Gi(t) = (1− γi)
∞∑
k=0
(γi)kri(t+ k), (3.8)
where γi ∈ [0, 1) is the discount factor or farsightedness of agent i and ri(t + k)
denotes the reward received by agent i at time step t+ k. Exponential discounting
is most commonly used for its mathematical convenience and because it ensures
consistent preferences over time. Other formulations of a return use e.g. finite time
horizons, average reward settings, as well as other ways of discounting, such as
hyperbolic discounting.
State-values. Given a behavior profileX, the expected return defines the state-value
function
V is (X) := TX
⟨
Gi(t) | s(t) = s
⟩i
s
, (3.9)
which is independent of time t, as one can see below. Here, the TX⟨...⟩ operator
denotes the behavioral and environmental average as defined in Eqs. 3.4 and 3.6.
Thus, the value of a state s for agent i is the expected return receivable from that
state s, given that all agents behave according to X
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Combining Eq. 3.8 with Eq. 3.9 the well known Bellman equation (Bellman, 1957)
can be derived as follows:
V is (X) = TX
⟨
Gi(t) | s(t) = s
⟩i
s
(3.10)
= TX
⟨
(1− γi)
∑∞
k=0
(γi)kri(t+ k) | s(t) = s
⟩i
s
(3.11)
= TX
⟨
(1− γi)ri(t) + γi(1− γi)
∑∞
k=0
(γi)kri(t+ 1 + k) | s(t) = s
⟩i
s
(3.12)
= TX
⟨
(1− γi)ri(t) + γiV is(t+1)(X) | s(t) = s
⟩i
s
(3.13)
= TX
⟨
(1− γi)Risas′ + γiV is′(X)
⟩i
s
. (3.14)
Thus, this recursive relationship between state-values declares that the value of a
state s is the discounted value of the subsequent state s(t+ 1) plus (1− γi) times
the reward received along the way. For the reward ri(t) received at time step t the
reward tensor Risas′ can be inserted, resolving the state at time step t to be s(t) = t.
The value of the subsequent state V is(t+1)(X) can be replaced with V is′(X).
Evaluating the behavioral and environmental average TX⟨...⟩ one can write:
V is (X) = (1− γi) · TX⟨R⟩is + γi
∑
s′
·X⟨T ⟩ss′ · V is′(X). (3.15)
As above, the reward tensor average reads TX⟨R⟩is. The expected subsequent state-
value V is′(X) can be written as a matrix multiplication of the effective Markov
transition matrix and the vector of state-values: ∑s′ X⟨T ⟩ss′ ·Vis′(X).
Writing Eq. 3.15 in matrix form reads
Vi(X) = (1− γi) · TX⟨R⟩i + γi · X⟨T⟩ ·Vi(X). (3.16)
A solution of the state-values Vi(X) can be obtained using matrix inversion
Vi(X) = (1− γi)
(
1Z − γi X⟨T⟩
)−1
TX⟨R⟩i . (3.17)
The computational complexity of matrix inversion makes this solution strategy
infeasible for large systems. Therefore many iterative solution methods exist (Wiering
and Otterlo, 2012).
State-action-values. Equivalent to state-value functions, state-action-value func-
tions Qisa are defined as the expected return, given agent i applied action a in state
s and then followed X accordingly:
Qisa(X) := TX
⟨
Gi(t) | s(t) = s, a(t) = a
⟩i
sa
. (3.18)
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They can be computed via
Qisa(X) = (1− γi) TX−i⟨R⟩isa + γi
∑
s′
X⟨T ⟩ss′ · V is′(X). (3.19)
Since the current reward results from the assumption, that the agent applied action
a in state s the behavioral-environmental average TX−i⟨. . .⟩ is used for the first term
in Eq. 3.19. Afterwards the agent follows Xi, resulting in the identical last term as
in Eq. 3.15.
From Eq. 3.7 and the fact that ∑aXisa = 1 immediately follows that
V is (X) =
∑
a
XisaQ
i
sa(X) (3.20)
holds for the inverse relation of state-action- and state-values.
Value reward relation. Interestingly, one can show that the dot product between the
stationary state distribution σ(X) of the effective Markov Chain with the transition
matrix X⟨T⟩ and the behavior average reward TX⟨R⟩i is identical to the dot product
of the stationary distribution and the state value Vi(X):
σ(X) ·Vi(X) = σ(X) · TX⟨R⟩i . (3.21)
To show this relation Eq. 3.16 needs to be multiplied by σ(X) :
σ(X) ·Vi(X) = (1− γi) · σ(X) · TX⟨R⟩i + γi · σ(X) · X⟨T⟩ ·Vi(X) (3.22)
= (1− γi) · σ(X) · TX⟨R⟩i + γi · σ(X) ·Vi(X) (3.23)
= σ(X) · TX⟨R⟩i , (3.24)
using the fact that σ(X) is a left eigenvector of X⟨T⟩ and subsequently rearranging
and dividing by the non-zero (1− γi), since γi ∈ [0, 1).
In other words, the state-average value is identical to the state-average reward,
independent of the discount factor γi. This equivalence qualifies this measure to
express the performance of an agent in one single scalar.
3.4 Summary
This chapter introduced a variant of a multi-agent environment system, based the
agent-environment interface principle. Basic concepts, such as the transition, reward
and behavioral profile tensors, behavioral and environmental averages, an agent’s
return, state- and state-action values were introduced. These concepts will be put to
use in the following chapters.
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First act: Deterministic limit of temporal
difference reinforcement learning
Eine herrliche Nacht, die empörte Einbildungskraft
zu verwildern.
Einstein - from Paul Dessau’s Einstein: First act
While Chapter 2 focused on a social learning update process between networked
agents, it left out any form of individual learning. This chapter brings the focus to
individual learning through reinforcements, building up on the agent-environment
framework introduced in Chapter 3. This chapter is necessary because, on the one
hand, the majority of cooperation studies focused on the framework of repeated
games, in which dynamic environmental state transitions are not provided. Yet,
from a reinforcement learning perspective, learning in multi-state environments is
standard. On the other hand, many established reinforcement algorithms are highly
stochastic and require considerate training time. Therefore it is generally hard to
understand how and what an agent has learned.
Hence, this chapter will present a novel methodological extension, refining tech-
niques of the statistical physics literature on learning dynamics to derive a determin-
istic limit of a general class of reinforcement learning algorithms, called temporal
difference learning. The focus of this chapter is on the derivation and analysis of the
learning equations, not their application to a social-ecological dilemma environment.
This will be the topic of Chapter 5. Instead, the method’s potential is demonstrated
with the three well established learning algorithms Q learning, SARSA learning and
Actor-Critic learning. Illustrations of their dynamics on previously used multi-agent,
multi-state environments reveal a wide range of different dynamical regimes, such as
convergence to fixed points, limit cycles and even deterministic chaos.
This chapter is based on parts of (Barfuss et al., 2019, P7).
4.1 Introduction
Individual learning through reinforcements is a central approach in the fields of
artificial intelligence (Busoniu et al., 2008; Sutton and Barto, 1998; Wiering and
Otterlo, 2012), neuroscience (Hassabis et al., 2017; Shah, 2012), learning in games
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(Fudenberg and Levine, 1998) and behavioral game theory (Camerer and Ho, 1999;
Camerer, 2003; Erev and Roth, 1998; Roth and Erev, 1995), thereby offering a
general purpose principle to either solve complex problems or explain behavior. Also
in the fields of complexity economics (Arthur, 1993, 1999) and social science (Macy
and Flache, 2002), reinforcement learning has been used as a model for human
behavior to study social dilemmas.
Dynamical systems understanding. However, there is a need for improved under-
standing and better qualitative insight into the characteristic dynamics that different
learning algorithms produce. Therefore, reinforcement learning has also been studied
from a dynamical systems perspective. In their seminal work, Börgers and Sarin
(1997) showed that one of the most basic reinforcement learning update schemes,
Cross learning (Cross, 1973), converges to the replicator dynamics of evolutionary
games theory in the continuous time limit. This has led to at least two, presumably
non-overlapping research communities, one from statistical physics (Aloric et al.,
2016; Bladon and Galla, 2011; Galla, 2009, 2011; Galla and Farmer, 2013; Marsili
et al., 2000; Realpe-Gomez et al., 2012; Sanders et al., 2012; Sato and Crutchfield,
2003; Sato et al., 2002, 2005), and one from computer science machine learning
(Bloembergen et al., 2015; Hennes et al., 2009, 2010; Kaisers and Tuyls, 2010; Tuyls
and Nowé, 2005; Tuyls and Parsons, 2007; Tuyls et al., 2003, 2006; Vrancx et al.,
2008). Thus, Sato and Crutchfield (2003) and Tuyls et al. (2003) independently
deduced identical learning equations in the year 2003.
The statistical physics community usually considers the deterministic limit of the
stochastic learning equations, assuming infinitely many interactions between the
agents before an adaptation of behavior occurs. This limit can either be performed in
continuous time with differential equations (Sato and Crutchfield, 2003; Sato et al.,
2002, 2005) or discrete time with difference equations (Bladon and Galla, 2011; Galla,
2009, 2011). The differences between both variants can be significant (Galla, 2011;
Realpe-Gomez et al., 2012). Deterministic chaos was found to emerge when learning
simple (Sato et al., 2002) as well as complicated games (Galla and Farmer, 2013).
Relaxing the assumption of infinitely many interactions between behavior updates
revealed that noise can change the attractor of the learning dynamics significantly,
e.g. by noise-induced oscillations (Galla, 2009, 2011).
However, these statistical physics studies so far considered only repeated normal
form games. These are games where the payoff depends solely on the set of current
actions, typically encoded in the entries of a payoff matrix (for the typical case of
two players). Receiving payoff and choosing another set of joint actions is performed
repeatedly. This setup lacks the possibility to study dynamically changing environ-
ments and their interplay with multiple agents. In those systems, rewards do not
depend only on the joint action of agents, but also on the states of the environment.
Environmental state changes may occur probabilistically and depend also on joint
actions and the current state. Such a setting is also known as a Markov game
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or stochastic game (Neyman and Sorin, 2003; Shapley, 1953). Thus, a repeated
normal form game is a special case of a stochastic game with only one environmental
state. Notably Akiyama and Kaneko (2000, 2002) did emphasize the importance of a
dynamically changing environment, however did not utilize a reinforcement learning
update scheme.
The computer science machine learning community dealing with reinforcement
learning as a dynamical system (see Bloembergen et al. (2015) for an overview)
particularly emphasizes the link between evolutionary game theory and multi-agent
reinforcement learning as a well grounded theoretical framework for the latter
(Bloembergen et al., 2015; Tuyls and Nowé, 2005; Tuyls and Parsons, 2007; Tuyls et al.,
2006). This dynamical systems perspective is proposed as a way to gain qualitative
insights about the variety of multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms (see
Busoniu et al. (2008) for a review). Consequently, this literature developed a focus
on the translation of established reinforcement learning algorithms to a dynamical
systems description, as well as the development of new algorithms based on insights
of a dynamical systems perspective. While there is more work on stateless games (e.g.
Q learning (Tuyls et al., 2003), frequency adjusted multi-agent Q learning (Kaisers
and Tuyls, 2010)), multi-agent learning dynamics for multi-state environments have
been developed as well, such as the piecewise replicator dynamics (Vrancx et al.,
2008), the state-coupled replicator dynamics (Hennes et al., 2009) or the reverse
engineering state-coupled replicator dynamics (Hennes et al., 2010).
Research challenge. Both communities, statistical physics and machine learning,
share the interest in better qualitative insight into multi-agent learning dynamics.
While the statistical physics community focuses more on dynamical properties the
same set of learning equations can produce, it leaves a research gap of learning
equations capable of handling multiple environmental states. The machine learning
community on the other hand aims more towards algorithm development, but so far
put their focus less on a dynamical systems understanding. Taken together, there
is the challenge of developing a dynamical systems theory of multi-agent learning
dynamics in varying environmental states.
Overview. This chapter aims to contribute to such a dynamical systems theory
of multi-agent learning dynamics. It presents a novel methodological extension for
obtaining the deterministic limit of multi-state temporal difference reinforcement
learning, based on the interaction-adaptation timescales separation. In essence, it
consists of formulating the temporal difference error for batch learning, and sending
the batch size to infinity. This method is performed on the three prominent learning
algorithms of Q learning, SARSA learning and Actor-Critic learning. Illustrations of
their learning dynamics reveal multiple different dynamical regimes, such as fixed
points, periodic orbits and deterministic chaos.
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In Sec. 4.2 temporal difference reinforcement learning is introduced, based on the
foundations presented in Chapter 3. Sec. 4.3 then presents the novel methodological
extension to obtain the deterministic limit of temporal difference reinforcement
learning, and demonstrates it for multi-state Q learning, SARSA learning and Actor-
Critic learning. Sec. 4.4 illustrates their learning dynamics with previously used
two-agents two-actions two-states environments, before Sec. 4.5 summarizes the main
findings of this chapter.
4.2 Background: Temporal difference reinforcement learning
In contrast to the typical game theoretic assumption of perfect information agents
are assumed to know nothing about the game in advance. They can only gain
information about the environment and other agents through interactions. They
do not know the true reward tensor R or the true transition probabilities Tsas′ (see
Chapter 3 for the mathematical foundations). They experience only reinforcements
(i.e. particular rewards Risas′), while observing the current true Markov state of the
environment.
In essence, reinforcement learning consists of iterative behavior changes towards a
behavior profile with maximum state-values. However, due to the agents’ limited
information about the environment, they generally cannot compute a behavior
profile’s true state- and state-action values, V is (X) (Eq. 3.17) and Qisa(X) (Eq.
3.19), as defined in the previous section. Therefore, agents use time dependent state-
and state-action-value approximations, V˜ is (t) and Q˜isa(t), during the reinforcement
learning process.
4.2.1 Temporal difference error
Basically, state-action-value approximations Q˜isa get iteratively updated by a temporal
difference error TDisa(t):
Q˜isa(t+ 1) = Q˜isa(t) + αiTDisa(t), (4.1)
with αi ∈ (0, 1) being the learning rate of agent i.
The temporal difference error expresses a difference in the estimation of state-
action values. New experience is used to compute a new estimate of the current
state-action-value and corrected by the old estimate. The estimate from the new
experience uses exactly the recursive relation of value functions from the Bellmann
equation (Eq. 3.14),
30
4.2 Background: Temporal difference reinforcement learning
TDisa(t) = δss(t)δaa(t)
·
[
(1− γi)Ris(t)a(t)a−i(t)s(t+1) + γi ⋎is(t+1) (t)  
estimate from new experience
− ⋎is(t)(t)  
old estimate
]
. (4.2)
Here, s and a denote the state-action pair whose temporal difference error is calculated.
With s(t), a(t), etc. the state, action, etc. that occurred at time step t is referred to.
Thus, the notation Ris(t)a(t)a−i(t)s(t+1) denotes the entry of the reward tensor R
i
saa−is′
when at time step t the environmental state was s (s(t) = s), agent i chose action a
(a(t) = a), the other agents chose the joint action a−i (a−i(t) = a−i) and the next
environmental state was s′ (s(t+ 1) = s′). The ⋎is(t+1)(t) indicates the state-value
estimate at time step t of the state visited at the next time step s(t+ 1). ⋎is(t)(t)
denotes the value estimate at time step t of the current state s(t). Different choice
for these value estimations are possible, leading to different learning variants (see
below).
The Kronecker deltas δss(t), δaa(t) indicate that the temporal difference error for
state-action pair (s, a) is only non-zero when (s, a) was actually visited in time step t.
This denotes and emphasizes that agents can only learn from experience. In contrast,
e.g. experience-weighted-attraction learning (Camerer and Ho, 1999) assumes that
action-value approximations can be updated with hypothetical rewards an agent
would have received if it had played a different than the current action. These two
cases have been referred to as full vs. partial information (Marsili et al., 2000). Thus,
the Kronecker deltas in Eq. 4.2 indicate a partial information update. The agents
use only information experienced through interaction.
The state-action-value approximations Q˜isa are translated to a behavior profile
according to the Gibbs-Boltzmann distribution (Sutton and Barto, 1998)
Xisa(t) =
exp(βiQ˜isa(t))∑
b exp(βiQ˜isb(t))
, (4.3)
which is also called softmax. The behavior profile X becomes a dynamic variable as
well. The parameter βi controls the intensity of choice or the exploitation level of
agent i controlling the exploration-exploitation trade-off. In analogy to statistical
physics, βi is the inverse temperature. For high βi agents tend to exploit their learned
knowledge about the environment, leaning towards actions with high estimated state-
action value. For low βi agents are more likely to deviate from these high value
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actions in order to explore the environment further with the chance of finding actions,
which eventually might lead to even higher values. Other behavior profile translations
exist as well, e.g. ϵ-greedy (Sutton and Barto, 1998).
4.2.2 Three learning variants
The specific choices of the value estimates ⋎ in the temporal difference error result
in different reinforcement learning variants.
Q learning. For the Q learning algorithm (Sutton and Barto, 1998; Wiering and
Otterlo, 2012) ⋎is(t+1)(t) = maxb Q˜is(t+1)b(t) and ⋎is(t)(t) = Q˜is(t)a(t)(t). Thus, the Q
learning update takes the maximum of the next state-action-value approximations
as an estimate for the next state-value, regardless of the actual next action the agent
plays. This is reasonable because the maximum is the highest value achievable given
the current knowledge of the agent. For the state-value estimate of the current state,
the Q learner takes the current state-action-value approximation Qis(t)a(t)(t). This is
reasonable because this is exactly the quantity that gets updated by Eq. 4.1.
SARSA learning. For SARSA learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998; Wiering and
Otterlo, 2012) ⋎is(t+1)(t) = Q˜is(t+1)a(t+1)(t) and ⋎is(t)(t) = Q˜is(t)a(t)(t), where a(t+ 1)
denotes the action taken by agent i at the next time step. Thus, the SARSA algorithm
uses the five ingredients of an update sequence of State, Action, Reward, next State,
next Action to perform one update. In practice, the SARSA sequence has to be
shifted one time step back to know what the actual "next" action of the agent was.
Actor-Critic (AC) learning. For AC learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998; Wiering and
Otterlo, 2012) ⋎is(t+1)(t) = V˜ is(t+1)(t) and ⋎is(t)(t) = V˜ is(t)(t). Compared to Q and
SARSA learning, it has an additional data structure of state-value approximations,
which get separately updated according to V˜ is (t + 1) = V˜ is (t) + αi · TDisa(t). The
state-action-value approximations Q˜isa serve as the actor which get criticized by the
state-value approximations V˜ is .
Tab. 4.1a summarizes the values estimates ⋎ for these three learning variants. Q
and SARSA learning are structurally more similar compared to the Actor-Critic
learner, which uses an additional data structure of state-value approximations V˜ is .
4.3 Deterministic limit
The previous section gave only a brief introduction to temporal difference reinforce-
ment learning. A more comprehensive presentation can be found in the excellent
book by Sutton and Barto (1998).
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Q
SARSA
AC
⋎is(t+1)(t) ⋎is(t)(t)
maxb Q˜is(t+1)b(t) Q˜is(t)a(t)(t)
Q˜is(t+1)a(t+1)(t) Q˜is(t)a(t)(t)
V˜ is(t+1)(t) V˜ is(t)(t)
(a) K=1
⋎is(t+1)(t) ⋎is(t)(t)
maxQisa(X) 1βi logXisa(t)
nextV isa(X) 1βi logXisa(t)
nextV isa(X) /
(b) K =∞
Table 4.1: Overview of the three reinforcement learning variants: Q learning, SARSA
learning and Actor-Critic (AC) learning. Shown in the columns are the value estimates for the
next state ⋎is(t+1)(t) and the current state ⋎is(t)(t) for both ends of the batch size spectrum:
K = 1 and K =∞.
This section will present a novel extension to the methodology of interaction-
adaptation timescales separation to the general class of temporal difference rein-
forcement learning. In summary, i) a batch formulation of the temporal difference
error will be given, ii) the batch size is sent to infinity, separating the timescales of
interaction and adaptation and iii) a resulting deterministic limit conversion rule for
discrete time updates is presented.
This method is then showcased with the three learning variants of Q, SARSA and
Actor-Critic learning. For the statistical physics community, the novelty consists
of learning equations, capable of handling environmental state transitions. For the
machine learning community the novelty lies in the systematic methodology used to
obtain the deterministic learning equations. Note that these deterministic learning
equations will not depend on the state- or state-action-value approximations anymore,
being iterated maps of the behavior profile alone.
Following e.g. Bladon and Galla (2011), Sato and Crutchfield (2003), and Sato
et al. (2005), Eqs. 4.1 and 4.3 are combined to
Xisa(t+ 1) =
Xisa(t) exp
(
αiβiTDisa(t)
)
∑
bX
i
sb(t) exp
(
αiβiTDisb(t)
) . (4.4)
Although it appears that only the product αiβi matters for a behavior profile update,
the temporal difference error TDisa may depend only on the exploitation level βi, as
shown below.
Next, the temporal difference error for batch learning is presented.
4.3.1 Batch learning
Batch learning means that several time steps of interaction with the environment and
the other agents take place before an update of the state-action-value approximations
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and the behavior profile occurs. It has also been interpreted as a form of history
replay (Lange et al., 2012) which is essential to stabilize the learning process when
function approximation (e.g. by deep neural networks) is used (Mnih et al., 2015).
History (i.e. already experienced state, action, next state triples) is used again for
an update of the state-action-value approximations.
Imagine that the information from these interactions are stored inside a batch of
size K ∈ N. The corresponding temporal difference error of batch size K reads:
TDisa(t;K) :=
1
K(s, a)
K−1∑
k=0
[
δss(t+k)δaa(t+k)
·
(
(1− γi)Ris(t+k)a(t+k)a−i(t+k)s(t+k+1)
+ γi ⋎is(t+k+1) (t)−⋎is(t)(t)
)]
(4.5)
where K(s, a) = max(1,∑K−1k=0 δss(t+k)δaa(t+k)) denotes the number of times the
state-action pair (s, a) was visited. If the state-action pair (s, a) was never visited,
K(s, a) = 1. The agents interact K times under the same behavior profile and
use the sample average to summarize the new experience in order to update the
state-action-value approximations:
Q˜isa(t+K) = Q˜isa(t) + αiTDisa(t;K). (4.6)
The notation TDisa(t) is short for a batch update of batch size 1: TDisa(t) = TDisa(t; 1).
4.3.2 Separation of timescales
The deterministic limit of the temporal difference learning dynamics is obtained by
sending the batch size to infinity, K →∞. Equivalently, this can be regarded as a
separation of timescales. Two processes can be distinguished during an update of
the state-action-value approximations ∆Q˜isa(t) := Q˜isa(t+ 1)− Q˜isa(t): adaptation
and interaction,
∆Q˜isa(t) = αiδss(t)δaa(t)
·
adaptation  (
(1− γi)Ris(t)a(t)a−i(t)s(t+1) + γi ⋎is(t+1) (t)  
interaction
−⋎is(t) (t)
)
. (4.7)
By separating the timescales of both processes, one assumes that (infinitely) many
interactions happen before one step of behavior profile adaptation occurs.
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Under this assumption one can replace the sample average, i.e. the sum over
sequences of states and actions with the behavior profile average, i.e. the sum over
state-action behavior and transition probabilities according to
1
K(s, a)
K−1∑
k=0
δss(t+k)δaa(t+k) →
∑
s′
∑
a−i
X−i
sa−iTsaa−is′ . (4.8)
This is only true under the assumption of an ergodic transition tensors (c.f. Chapter
3). For example, the immediate reward Ri
s(t)a(t)a−i(t)s(t+1) in the temporal difference
error becomes TX−i⟨R⟩isa. The time t gets rescaled accordingly as well. Taking the
limit K →∞ in this way, the learning equations remain in discrete time, leaving the
continuous time limit following e.g. Galla and Farmer (2013), Sato and Crutchfield
(2003), and Sato et al. (2005) for future work.
4.3.3 Three learning variants
Next, the deterministic limits of the temporal difference error of the three learning
variants of Q, SARSA and Actor-Critic learning are presented. Inserting them
into Eq. 4.4 yields the complete description of the behavior profile update in the
deterministic limit. Tab. 4.1 presents an overview of the resulting equations and a
comparison to their batch size K = 1 versions.
Q learning
The temporal difference error of Q learning consists of three terms: i)Ri
s(t)a(t)a−i(t)s(t+1)
ii) maxb Q˜is(t+1)b(t) and iii) Q˜is(t)a(t)(t). As already stated Ris(t)a(t)a−i(t)s(t+1) →
TX−i⟨R⟩isa under K →∞. maxb Q˜is(t+1)b(t)→ maxQisa(X) which is defined as
maxQisa(X) :=
∑
s′
∑
a−i
X−i
sa−iTsaa−is′ maxb Q
i
s′b(X) (4.9)
using the deterministic limit conversion rule (Eq. 4.8). Because of the assumption
of infinite interactions, one can here replace the state-action-value approximations
Q˜is(t+1)b by the true state-action-values Qis′b as defined by Eq. 3.19. Note that in
Eq. 4.9 this true state-action-value carries the state-index s′ returning the maximum
state-action value of the next state.
For the third term, Eq. 4.3 is inverted, yielding Q˜isa(t) = (βi)−1 logXisa(t)+constis,
where constis is constant in actions, but may vary for each agent and state. Now, one
can easily show that the dynamics induced by Eq. 4.4 are invariant against additive
transformations in the temporal difference error TDisa(t,∞)→ TDisa(t,∞) + constis.
Thus, the third term can be converted according to Q˜is(t)a(t)(t)→ (βi)−1 logXisa(t).
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All together, the temporal difference error for Q learning in the deterministic limit
reads
qTDisa(t,∞) =(1− γi) TX−i⟨R⟩isa + γi · maxQisa(X)−
1
βi
logXisa(t). (4.10)
SARSA learning
Two of the three terms of the SARSA temporal difference error are identical to the
one of Q learning, leaving Q˜is(t+1)a(t+1)(t) which is replaced by
nextQisa(X) :=
∑
s′
∑
a−i
X−i
sa−iTsaa−is′
∑
b
Xis′bQ
i
s′b(X) (4.11)
using again the deterministic limit conversion rule (Eq. 4.8) and the state-action-
value Qis′b(X) of the behavior profile X according to Eq. 3.19. Thus, the temporal
difference error for the SARSA learning update in the deterministic limit reads
sarsaTDisa(t;∞) = (1− γi) TX−i⟨R⟩isa + γi · nextQisa(X)−
1
βi
logXisa(t). (4.12)
Actor-Critic (AC) learning
For the temporal difference error for AC learning one has to find replacements for i)
V˜ is(t+1)(t) and ii) V˜ is(t)(t). Applying again Eq. 4.8 yields V˜ is(t+1)(t)→ nextV isa defined
as
nextV isa =
∑
s′
∑
a−i
X−i
sa−iTsaa−is′V
i
s′(X), (4.13)
using Eq. 3.17 for the state-value V is′(X). Eq. 4.13 gives the average value of the
next state given that in the current state the agent took action a. From Eq. 3.20
immediately follows nextV isa(X) = nextQisa(X) from the SARSA update.
The second remaining term belongs to the slower adaptation timescale, or in other
words: occurs outside the batch. Thus, the deterministic limit conversion rule (Eq.
4.8) does not apply. One could think of a conversion V˜ is(t)(t) :=
∑
aX
i
saQ˜
i
s(t)a(t)(t)→
(βi)−1∑aXisa(t) logXisa(t). However, the remaining term is constant in action, and
therefore irrelevant for the dynamics, as argued above. Thus, one can simply put
V˜ is(t)(t)→ 0.
All together, the temporal difference error of the Actor-Critic learner in the
deterministic limit reads
acTDisa(t,∞) =(1− γi) TX−i⟨R⟩isa + γi nextV isa(X) (4.14)
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4.3.4 Derivation of the Jacobian
The following sections present the derivation of the Jacobian matrix. This is done in
order to compute Lyapunov exponents using an iterative QR decomposition according
to Sandri (1996). Readers not interested in these mathematical details are invited to
safely skip this section.
Eq. 4.4 constitutes a map f , which iteratively updates the behavior profile
X ∈ RN×M×Z . Consequently, one can represent its derivative as a Jacobian tensor
f ′(X) ∈ RN×M×Z×N×M×Z .
Let Aisa := Xisa exp
(
αiβiTDisa(X)
)
be the numerator of Eq. 4.4, and Bis :=
∑
bA
i
sb
its denominator, i.e. f =: A/B. Hence,
f ′(X) = A
′B −B′A
B2
(4.15)
or, more precisely, in components,
df isa(X)
dXjrb
=
dAisa(X)
dXj
rb
Bis(X)− dB
i
s
dXj
rb
(X)Aisa(X)
(Bis(X))2
. (4.16)
A and B are known, and if A′ is known, B′ is easily obtained by dB
i
s(X)
dXj
rb
=∑
c
dAisc(X)
dXj
rb
. Therefore one needs to compute A′ for the three types: Q, SARSA and
Actor-Critic learning.
Q learning
One can rewrite Aisa for the Q learner as
Aisa := (Xisa)(1−α
i) exp
(
αiβiT¯Disa(X)
)
, (4.17)
where the estimate of the current value was removed from the temporal difference
error, leaving the truncated TD error as
T¯Disa(X) := (1− γi) TX−i⟨R⟩isa + γi maxQisa(X). (4.18)
Hence, one can write the derivative of A as
dAisa(X)
dXjrb
=exp
(
αiβiT¯Disa(X)
)
·
(
(1− αi)(Xisa)−α
i dXisa
dXjrb
+ αiβi(Xisa)(1−α
i)dT¯D
i
sa(X)
dXjrb
)
. (4.19)
37
Chapter 4 First act: Deterministic limit of temporal difference reinforcement learning
Since ∑cXisc = 1, dXisa/dXjrb can be expressed as
dXisa
dXjrb
= δijδsr(2δab − 1). (4.20)
The derivative of the truncated temporal difference error reads
dT¯Disa(X)
dXjrb
= (1− γi)d TX−i⟨R⟩
i
sa
dXjrb
+ γid
maxQisa(X)
dXjrb
. (4.21)
One can write the derivative of the reward as
d TX−i⟨R⟩isa
dXjrb
=
∑
s′
∑
a−i
dX−i
sa−i
dXjrb
Tsaa−is′R
i
saa−is′ (4.22)
using Eq. 3.5 and Eq. 3.6, where the derivatives dX−i
sa−i/dX
j
rb need to be executed
according to Eq. 4.20.
For the derivative of the maximum next value one can write accordingly
dmaxQisa(X)
dXjrb
=
∑
s′
∑
a−i
dX−i
sa−i
dXjrb
Tsaa−is′ maxc Q
i
s′c(X)
+
∑
s′
∑
a−i
X−i
sa−iTsaa−is′
dmaxcQis′c(X)
dXjrb
. (4.23)
Let am := argmaxaQisa(X), then
dmaxcQisc(X)
dXjrb
= δaam
dQisa(X)
dXjrb
(4.24)
and
dQisa(X)
dXjrb
= (1−γi)d TX−i⟨R⟩
i
sa
dXjrb
+γi
∑
s′
dX⟨T ⟩ss′
dXjrb
V is′(X)+X⟨T ⟩ss′
dV is′(X)
dXjrb
. (4.25)
For the derivative of the effective Markov Chain transition tensor one can write
dX⟨T ⟩ss′
dXjrb
=
∑
a
dXsa
dXjrb
Tsas′ , (4.26)
using Eqs. 3.4 and where again the derivatives dXsa/dXjrb need to be executed
according to Eq. 4.20.
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For the derivative of the state value it is useful to write Eq. 3.17 as V is =
(1− γi)∑s′M−1ss′ TX⟨R⟩is′ with M := (1Z − γi X⟨T ⟩). Thus,
dV is (X)
dXjrb
= (1− γi)
∑
s′′
d(M−1ss′′)
dXjrb
TX⟨R⟩is′′ +M−1ss′′
d TX⟨R⟩is′′
dXjrb
. (4.27)
To obtain the derivative of the inverse matrix M−1 one can use (M−1M)′ = 0 =
(M−1)′M +M−1M ′ and therefore (M−1)′ = −M−1M ′M−1. M ′ is obtained by
dMss′
dXjrb
= −γidX⟨T ⟩ss′
dXjrb
. (4.28)
The derivative of the reward is given by
d TX⟨R⟩is
dXjrb
=
∑
s′
∑
a
dXsa
dXjrb
Tsas′R
i
sas′ , (4.29)
using Eq. 3.4 and Eq. 3.6, and where again the derivatives dXsa/dXjrb need to be
executed according to Eq. 4.20.
Finally, all terms to compute the Jacobian tensor for the Q learning dynamics in
their deterministic limit are given.
SARSA learning
The computation of the Jacobian tensor for the SARSA learning update in its
deterministic limit is similar, except the truncated TD error reads
T¯Disa(X) := (1− γi) TX−i⟨R⟩isa + γi nextQisa(X). (4.30)
instead of Eq. 4.18. Hence, for SARSA learning
dT¯Disa(X)
dXjrb
= (1− γi)d TX−i⟨R⟩
i
sa
dXjrb
+ γid
nextQisa(X)
dXjrb
, (4.31)
and
d nextQisa(X)
dXjrb
=
∑
s′
∑
a−i
dX−i
sa−i
dXjrb
Tsaa−is′
∑
c
Xis′cQ
i
s′c(X)
+
∑
s′
∑
a−i
X−i
sa−iTsaa−is′
d[∑cXis′cQis′c(X)]
dXjrb
. (4.32)
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The derivative of ∑cXis′cQis′c(X) reads
d[∑cXis′cQis′c(X)]
dXjrb
=
∑
c
(
dXis′c
dXjrb
Qis′c(X) +Xis′c
dQis′c
dXjrb
)
. (4.33)
All remaining terms have already been given in the previous section for the Q learning
Jacobian tensor.
Actor-Critic learning
For the Actor-Critic learning update, the corresponding Eq. 4.17 reads
Aisa := Xisa exp
(
αiβiTDisa(X)
)
, (4.34)
with the temporal difference error as given in Eq. 4.14. Left to obtain is the derivative
of the next value estimate:
d nextV isa(X)
dXjrb
=
∑
s′
∑
a−i
dX−i
sa−i
dXjrb
Tsaa−is′V
i
s′(X) +
∑
s′
∑
a−i
X−i
sa−iTsaa−is′
dV is′(X)
dXjrb
.
(4.35)
The derivative of the next value V is′ is given by Eq. 4.27. These are all terms necessary
to compute the Jacobian matrix for the Actor-Critic learning update.
4.4 Application to example environments
In the following section the derived deterministic learning equations will be applied in
two different environments. Specifically, the three well established temporal difference
learning variants (Q learning, SARSA learning and Actor-Critic (AC) learning) are
compared in two different two-agents (N = 2), two-actions (M = 2) and two-states
(Z = 2) environments: a two-state Matching Pennies game and a two-state Prisoner’s
Dilemma. Since the focus of this chapter is the derivation of the deterministic
temporal difference learning equations, environments have been chosen, which have
been used previously in related works (Hennes et al., 2009, 2010; Hilbe et al., 2018;
Vrancx et al., 2008).
Note also that a comparison between the deterministic limit and the stochastic
equations is left to future work, which presumably would add a noise term to the
equations following the example of Galla (2009).
To measure the performance of an agent’s behavior in a single scalar one can use
the stationary state average reward σ(X) · TX⟨R⟩i, or equivalently the stationary
state average value σ(X) ·Vi(X) (Eq. 3.21) as argued in Chapter 3.
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In the following examples only homogeneous agents will be considered, i.e. agents
whose parameters will not differ from each other. Therefore agent-indices will be
dropped from αi, βi and γi for the ease of notation. Parts of Chapter 5 will explore
the heterogeneous agent case.
Figure 4.1: Two-state Matching Pennies environment. Rewards are given in black font in
the payoff tables for each state. State transitions are indicated by blue arrows.
4.4.1 Two-state Matching Pennies
Environment description. The single state matching pennies game is a paradigmatic
two-agents two-actions game. Imagine the situation of soccer penalty kicks. The
keeper (agent 1) can choose to jump either to the left or right side of the goal, the
kicker (agent 2) can choose to kick the ball also either to the left or the right. If both
agents choose the identical side, the keeper agent wins, otherwise the kicker agent.
In the two-state version of the game according to Hennes et al. (2010) the rules
are extend as follows: In state 1 the situation is as described in the single state
version. Whenever agent 1 (the keeper) decides to jump to the left, the environment
transitions to state 2 in which the agents switch roles: agent 1 now plays the kicker
and agent 2 the keeper. From here, whenever agent 1 (now the kicker) decides to
kick to the right side, the environment transitions again to state 1 and both agents
switch their roles again.
Fig. 4.1 illustrate this two-state Matching Pennies games. Formally, the payoff
matrices are given by(
R1111s′ ,R
2
111s′ R
1
112s′ ,R
2
112s′
R1121s′ ,R
2
121s′ R
1
122s′ ,R
2
122s′
)
=
(
1,0 0,1
0,1 1,0
)
in state 1 and(
R1211s′ ,R
2
211s′ R
1
212s′ ,R
2
212s′
R1221s′ ,R
2
221s′ R
1
222s′ ,R
2
222s′
)
=
(
0,1 1,0
1,0 0,1
)
in state 2 for s′ ∈ {1, 2}. State transitions are governed by(
T1112 T1122
T1212 T1222
)
= ( 1 10 0 ) and
(
T2111 T2121
T2211 T2221
)
= ( 0 01 1 ) .
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Figure 4.2: Three learners in two-state Matching Pennies environment for low farsighted-
ness γ = 0.1; intensity of choice β = 5.0. On the left side, the temporal difference errors for
the Q learner (Eq. 4.10), SARSA learner (Eq. 4.12 ) and Actor-Critic (AC) learner (Eq. 4.14)
are shown in two behavior phase space sections, one for each state. The arrows indicate the
average direction the temporal difference errors drive the learners towards, averaged over all
phase space points of the other state. Arrow colors additionally encode their lengths. Selected
trajectories are shown in the phase space sections, as well as by reward trajectories on the
right, plotting the average reward value (Eq. 3.21) over time steps. Crosses in the phase
space subsections indicate the initial behavior (X111, X211, X121, X221) = (0.01, 0.99, 0.3, 0.4).
Circles signal the arrival at a fixed point, determined by the absolute difference of behavior
profiles between two subsequent time steps being below ϵ = 10−6. Trajectories are shown for
two different learning rates α = 0.02 (red) and α = 0.8 (blue). The bold reward trajectory
belongs to agent 1, the thin one to agent 2. Note that the temporal difference error is
independent from the learning rate α. A variety of qualitatively different dynamical regimes
can be observed.
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Thus by construction, the probability of transitioning to the other state is inde-
pendent of agent 2’s action. Only agent 1 has agency over the state transitions. By
playing a uniformly random behavior profile (X111, X211, X121, X221) = (0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5)
both agents would obtain an average reward of 0.5 per time step.
Behavior space at low farsightedness. Fig. 4.2 compares the learners’ temporal
difference errors in the behavior phase space sections for each environmental state at a
comparable low discount factor γ ∈ [0, 1) of γ = 0.1, as well as learning trajectories for
an exemplary initial condition for two learning rates α ∈ (0, 1), a low one (α = 0.02)
and a high one (α = 0.8). Overall, one observes a variety of qualitatively different
dynamical regimes, such as fixed points, periodic orbits and chaotic motion.
Specifically, one can see that Q learners and SARSA learners behave qualitatively
similar in contrast to the AC learners; for both learning rates α. For the low learning
rate α = 0.02, Q and SARSA learners reach a fixed point of playing both actions
with equal probability in both states, yielding a reward of 0.5. Due to the low α, this
takes approx. 600 time steps. In contrast, the reward trajectory of the AC learner
appears to be chaotic. Fig. 4.4 confirms this observation, which will be discussed in
more detail below.
For the high learning rate α = 0.8 both Q and SARSA learners enter a periodic
limit cycle. Differences in the trajectories of Q and SARSA learners are clearly
visible. The time average reward of this periodic orbit appears to be approx. 0.5 for
each agent, identical to the reward of the fixed point at lower α. The AC learners,
however, converge to a fixed point after oscillating near the edges of the phase space.
At this fixed point in state 1 agent 1 plays action 1 with probability 1. Thus, it has
trapped the system into state 2. In state 2, agent 1 plays action 2 and agent 2 plays
action 1, both with full probability. Consequently agent 1 receives a reward of 1,
whereas agent 2 receives zero reward. One might ask, why does agent 2 not decrease
its probability for playing action 1, thereby increasing its own reward? And indeed,
the arrows of the temporal difference error suggest this change of behavior profile.
However, agent 2 cannot follow because its behavior is trapped on the simplex of
non-zero action probabilities X22a. For only M = 2 actions, X221 = 1 thus cannot
change anymore, regardless of the temporal difference error.
Behavior space at high farsightedness. Increasing the discount factor to γ = 0.9,
one observes the learning rate α to set the timescale of learning (Fig. 4.3). The
intensity of choice remained β = 5.0. A high learning rate α = 0.8 corresponds
to faster learning in contrast to a low learning rate α = 0.02. Also the ratio of
learning timescales is comparable to the inverse ratio of learning rates. For both α,
Q and SARSA learners reach a fixed point, whereas the AC learners seem to move
chaotically (details to be investigated below). Comparing the trajectories between
the learning rates α, one observes a similar shape for each pair of learners. However,
the similarity of the AC trajectories decreases at larger time steps.
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Figure 4.3: Two-state Matching Pennies environment for high farsightedness γ = 0.9;
otherwise identical to Fig. 4.2.
Farsightedness and learning rate combined. So far, two parameters were varied:
the farsightedness γ ∈ [0, 1) and the learning rate α ∈ (0, 1). Combining Figs. 4.2
and 4.3 all four combinations of a low and a high γ with a low and a high α have
been investigated. One can summarize that Q and SARSA learners converge to a
fixed point for all combinations of discount factor γ and learning rate α, except when
γ is low and α simultaneously high. AC dynamics seem chaotic for all combinations
of α and γ.
To investigate the relationship between the parameters more thoroughly, Fig. 4.4
shows bifurcation diagrams with the bifurcation parameters α and γ. Additionally,
it also gives the largest Lyapunov exponents for each learner and each parameter
combination. A largest Lyapunov exponent greater than zero is a key characteristic
of chaotic motion. They are computed from the analytically derived Jacobian matrix,
iteratively used in a QR decomposition according to Sandri (1996).
The largest Lyapunov exponent for Q and SARSA learners align almost perfectly
with each other, whereas the largest Lyapunov exponent of the AC learners behaves
qualitatively different. First, consider the behavior of the Q and SARSA learners: For
high learning rates α and low farsightedness γ Fig. 4.4 shows a periodic orbit with few
(four) points in phase space. Largest Lyapunov exponents are distinctly below 0 at
those regimes. Increasing the farsightedness γ both learners enter a regime of visiting
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Figure 4.4: Varying farsightedness γ and learning rate α in two-state Matching Pennies
environment for intensity of choice β = 5.0. On the left, the farsightedness γ is varied with
learning rate α = 0.8, as indicated by the gray vertical lines on the right. On the right, the
learning rate α is varied with discount factor γ = 0.1 as indicated by the gray vertical lines
on the left. The three top panels show a the visited behavior points during 1000 iterations
after a transient period of 100000 time steps from initial behavior (X111, X211, X121, X221) =
(0.01, 0.99, 0.3, 0.4) for the Q learner (green), the SARSA learner (blue) and the Actor-Critic
(AC) learner (red). Visited points are mapped to the function 8X221 + 4X121 + 2X211 +X111
on the vertical axes to give a fuller image of the visited behavior profiles. The bottom panel
shows the corresponding largest Lyapunov exponents for the three learners. Overall, Q and
SARSA learner behave qualitatively more similar than the Actor-Critic learner.
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many points in phase space around the stable fixed point (X111, X211, X121, X221) =
(0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5). The largest Lyapuonv exponents are close to zero. With increasing
γ the distance around this fixed point solution decreases until the dynamics converge
from a farsightedness γ slightly greater than 0.5 on. From there the largest Lyapunov
exponent decreases again for further increasing γ. The same observations can be
made along a decreasing bifurcation parameter α, except that at the end, for low α
the largest Lyapunov exponents do not decrease as distinctly as for high γ.
The behavior of the Actor-Critic dynamics is qualitatively different from the one
of Q and SARSA. The placement of the fixed points on the natural numbers grid
suggests that the AC learners get confined on one of the 16 (MNZ) corners of the
behavior phase space. No regularity to which fixed point the AC learners converge can
be deduced. The largest Lyapunov exponent is always above zero and experiences an
overall decreasing behavior. Similarly for a decreasing bifurcation parameter α, the
largest Lyapunov exponent tends to decrease as well. Different from the bifurcation
diagram along γ, for low α the system might enter a periodic motion, but only for
some parameters α. No regularity can be determined at which parameters α the AC
learners enter a periodic motion. A more thorough investigation of the nonlinear
dynamics, especially those of the Actor-Critic learner seems of great interest, is,
however, beyond the scope of this chapter and leaves promising paths for future
work.
Exploitation level. Concerning the parameter β, the intensity of choice or exploita-
tion level, one can infer from the update equations (Eq. 4.4 combined with Eq. 4.12
and Eq. 4.14), that the dynamics of the AC learners are invariant for a constant
product αβ. This is because the temporal difference error of the Actor-Critic learner
in the deterministic limit is independent of β. Further, the dynamics of the SARSA
learner will converge to the dynamics of the AC learner under β → ∞. Fig. 4.5
nicely confirms these two observations. The second observation can also be made
with Tab. 4.1. Since the value estimate of the future state is identical for SARSA
and AC learning, letting the value estimate of the current state vanish by sending
β →∞ makes the SARSA learners approximate the AC learners.
As mentioned before, β controls the exploration-exploitation trade-off. In the
temporal difference errors of the Q and SARSA learner it appears in the term
indicating the value estimate of the current state −1/βi log(Xisa). If this term
dominates the temporal difference error (i.e. if β is small), the learners tend towards
the center of behavior space, i.e. (X111, X211, X121, X221) = (0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5), forgetting
what they have learned about the obtainable reward. This characteristic happens to
be favorable in this two-state Matching Pennies environment, which is why Q and
SARSA learners perform better in finding the (X111, X211, X121, X221) = (0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5)
solution. On the other hand, if β is large, the temporal difference error is dominated
by the current reward and future value estimate. Not being able to forget, the
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Figure 4.5: Varying exploitation level β under constant α · β in two-state Matching
Pennies environment for farsightedness γ = 0.9. On the left trajectories of the three
learners (Q: green, SARSA: blue, Actor-Critic(AC): red) are shown in the two phase space
sections, one for each state. On the right, the corresponding reward trajectories are shown. The
initial behavior was (X111, X211, X121, X221) = (0.01, 0.99, 0.3, 0.4). The bold reward trajectory
belongs to agent 1, the thin one to agent 2. One observes the deterministic limit of Actor-Critic
learning to be invariant under constant α · β and SARSA learning to converge to AC learning
under β →∞.
learners might get trapped in unfavorable behavior, as one can see observing the
Actor-Critic learners. To calibrate β it is useful to make oneself clear that it must
come in the unit of [log behavior] / [reward].
4.4.2 Two-state Prisoner’s Dilemma
Environment description. The single state Prisoner’s Dilemma is another paradig-
matic two-agents, two-actions game. It has been used to model social dilemmas and
study the emergence of cooperation. It describes a situation in which two prisoners
are separately interrogated, leaving them with the choice to either cooperate with
each other by not speaking to the police or defecting by testifying.
The two-state version, which has been used as a test environment also by Hennes et
al. (2009, 2010) and Vrancx et al. (2008), extends this situation somewhat artificially
by playing a Prisoner’s Dilemma in each of the two states with a transition probability
of 10% from one state to the other if both agents chose the same action, and a
transition probability of 90% if both agents chose opposite actions.
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Figure 4.6: Two-state Prisoner’s Dilemma environment. Rewards are given in black font in
the payoff tables for each state. State transitions are indicated by blue arrows.
Fig. 4.6 illustrates these game dynamics. Formally, the payoff matrices are given
by (
R1111s′ ,R
2
111s′ R
1
112s′ ,R
2
112s′
R1121s′ ,R
2
121s′ R
1
122s′ ,R
2
122s′
)
=
(
3,3 0,10
10,0 2,2
)
in state 1 and(
R1211s′ ,R
2
211s′ R
1
212s′ ,R
2
212s′
R1221s′ ,R
2
221s′ R
1
222s′ ,R
2
222s′
)
=
(
4,4 0,10
10,0 1,1
)
in state 2 for s′ ∈ {1, 2}, respectively. The corresponding state transition probabilities
are given by(
T1112 T1122
T1212 T1222
)
=
(
T2111 T2121
T2211 T2221
)
= ( 0.1 0.90.9 0.1 ) .
To be precise, the rewards in each state do not resemble a classical social dilemma
situation. This is because if both agents were alternately cooperating and defecting,
both could receive a larger reward per time step compared to always cooperating.
Hence, this stochastic game, as it was used by Hennes et al. (2009, 2010) and Vrancx
et al. (2008), presents more a coordination than a cooperation challenge to the agents.
The multi-state environment can here function as a coordination device. A behavior
profile in which one agent exploits the other in one state, while being exploited in
the other state, would result in an average reward per time step of 5 for each agent,
e.g. (X111, X211, X121, X221) = (0, 1, 1, 0).
Behavior space at medium farsightedness. However, for all three learning types
with a medium ranged farsightedness (γ = 0.45) and an intensity of choice β = 5.0,
the temporal difference error arrows are pointing on average towards the lower left
defection-defection point for each state in behavior phase space (Fig. 4.7). To see
whether the three learning types may converge to the described defect-cooperate,
cooperate-defect solution, individual trajectories from two exemplary initial conditions
and for two learning rates α are shown, as before a small one (α = 0.02) and a high
one (α = 0.8).
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Figure 4.7: Two-state Prisoner’s Dilemma environment for farsightedness γ = 0.45; other-
wise identical to Fig. 4.2.
One observes qualitatively different behavior across all three learners. The Q
learners converge to equilibria with average rewards distinctly below 5, the SARSA
learners converge to equilibira with average rewards of almost 5 for both learning
rates α and both exemplary initial conditions. Both Q and SARSA learners converge
to solutions of proper probabilistic behavior, i.e. choosing action cooperate and
action defect with non-vanishing chance. The Actor-Critic learners on the other hand
converge to the deterministic defect-cooperate, cooperate-defect behavior described
above for the initial condition shown with the non-dashed lines in Fig. 4.7 for both
learning rates α (shown in red and blue). For the other exemplary initial condition,
shown with the dashed lines, it converges to an all-defection solution in both states
for both α.
Interestingly, for all learners, all combinations of initial conditions and learning
rates converge to a fixed point solution, except for the Q learners with a comparably
high learning rate α = 0.8, which enter a periodic behavior solution for the initial
condition with the non-dashed line. The same phenomenon occurred also in the
Matching Pennies environment for low farsightedness γ = 0.1, however there for both,
Q and SARSA learners. It seems to be caused by the comparably high learning rate.
A high learning rate overshoots the behavior update resulting in a circling behavior
around the fixed point. As in Fig. 4.2, the time average reward of the periodic orbit
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seems to be comparable to the reward of the corresponding fixed point at lower α.
Furthermore, one observes the same time re-scaling effect of the learning rate α in
Fig. 4.7 as in Fig. 4.3.
Figure 4.8: Varying farsightedness γ in two-state Prisoner’s Dilemma environment for
learning rate α = 0.2 and intensity of choice β = 5.0. The four top panels show the visited
behavior points X111, X211, X121, X221 during 1000 iterations after a transient period of 5000
time steps from initial behavior (X111, X211, X121, X221) = (0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5) in blue and from
initial behavior (X111, X211, X121, X221) = (0.51, 0.49, 0.49, 0.51) in red for the Q learner on the
left, the SARSA learner in the middle and the Actor-Critic learner on the right. The bottom
panel shows the corresponding largest Lyapunov exponents for the two initial conditions.
Above a critical farsightedness γ all learners find the high rewarding solution from the red
initial condition, but do not do so from the blue initial condition.
Varying farsightedness. To visualize the influence of the discount factor γ on the
converged behavior, Fig. 4.8 shows a bifurcation diagram along the bifurcation param-
eter γ for two initial conditions. Dots in blue result from a uniformly random behavior
profile of (X111, X211, X121, X221) = (0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5), whereas the dots in red initially
started from the behavior profile (X111, X211, X121, X221) = (0.51, 0.49, 0.49, 0.51).
Across all learners, lower discount factors γ correspond to all-defect solutions,
whereas for higher γ the solutions from the initial condition shown in red tend
towards the cooperate-defect, defect-cooperate solution. For low γ, the agents are
less aware of the presence of other states and find the all-defect equilibrium solution
of the iterated normal form Prisoner’s Dilemma. The state transition probabilities
have less effect on the learning dynamics. Only above a certain farsightedness, the
agents find the more rewarding cooperate-defect, defect-cooperate solution.
The observation from Fig. 4.7 is confirmed that the probability to cooperate (i.e.
here X111 and X221 ) is lowest for the Q learners, mid range for the SARSA learners
and 1 for the Actor-Critic learners. One reason for this observation can be found in
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the intensity of choice parameter β. It balances the reward obtainable in the current
behavior space segment with the forgetting of current knowledge to be open to new
solutions. Such forgetting expresses itself by temporal difference error components
pointing towards the center of behavior space. Thus, a relatively small β = 5.0 can
explain why solutions at the edge of the behavior space cannot be reached by Q and
SARSA learners. The AC learner misses this forgetting term in the deterministic
limit and can therefore easily enter behavior profiles at the edge of the behavior
space.
Q and SARSA learners have a critical discount factor γ above which the cooperate-
defect, defect-cooperate high reward solution is obtained and below which the
all-defect low reward solution gets selected. However, for increasing discount factors
γ up to 1, Q and SARSA learners experience a drop in playing the cooperative action
probability.
The Actor-Critic learners approach the cooperate-defect, defect-cooperate solution
in two steps. For increasing γ, first the probability to cooperate of agent 2 in state
2 (X221) jumps from zero to one while agent 1 still defects in state 1. Only after a
slight increase of γ, agent 1 then also cooperates in state 1 (X111).
Interestingly, for the uniformly random initial behavior condition shown in blue,
there is no critical discount factor γ and no learners come close to the cooperate-defect,
defect-cooperate solution. Here, only for γ close to 1, all cooperation probabilities
Xis1 gradually increase. Furthermore, exactly at those γ, where the cooperate-defect,
defect-cooperate solution is obtained from the initial behavior condition shown in
red, the solutions from the uniformly random initial behavior condition (blue) have a
largest Lyapuonv exponent greater than 0. At other values of γ, the largest Lyapunov
exponents for the two initial conditions overlap. This suggests that largest Lyapunov
exponents greater than zero may point to the fact that other, perhaps more rewarding
solutions may exist in phase space. A more thorough investigation regarding this
multi-stability is an open point for future research.
Cooperation challenge. As argued above, the two-state Prisoner’s Dilemma as it
was used by Hennes et al. (2009, 2010) and Vrancx et al. (2008) presents rather a
coordination than a cooperation challenge to the agents. Fig. 4.9 demonstrates that
the derived learning dynamics are also capable to solve a cooperation challenge in a
stochastic game setting, for which a two-state Prisoner’s Dilemma was adapted in
analogy to Hilbe et al. (2018). Fig. 4.9 confirms previous findings that cooperation
emerges only in the stochastic game, compared to playing each Prisoner’s Dilemma
repeatedly (Hilbe et al., 2018). Further, cooperation only emerges for sufficiently
large farsightedness γ.
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Figure 4.9: Cooperation challenge in a two-state Prisoner’s Dilemma. At the top a two-
state Prisoner’s Dilemma game is shown, whose state games individually favor defection. At
the bottom the level of cooperation is shown SARSA learners with α = 0.016, β = 250 play
after reaching a fixed point from the center of behavior space (Xisa = 0.5 for all i, s, a) for
varying discount factors γ. Results for Q and AC learners are similar. Cooperation levels are
shown for the full stochastic game as well as for each individual state game played repeatedly.
For sufficiently large farsightedness cooperation can emerge in the stochastic game, in contrast
to the individual repeated games.
4.5 Summary
The main contribution of this chapter is the development of a technique to obtain
the deterministic limit of temporal difference reinforcement learning. Through
this chapter the literature on learning dynamics from statistical physics has been
combined with the evolutionary game theory-inspired learning dynamics literature
from machine learning. For the statistical physics community, the novelty consists
of learning equations, capable of handling environmental state transitions. For the
machine learning community the novelty lies in the systematic methodology which
was used to obtain the deterministic learning equations.
The presented methodology was demonstrated with the three prominent reinforce-
ment learning algorithms from computer science: Q learning, SARSA learning and
Actor-Critic learning. A comparison of their dynamics in previously used two-agents,
two-actions, two-states environments has revealed the existence of a variety of quali-
tatively different dynamical regimes, such as convergence to fixed points, periodic
orbits and deterministic chaos.
It was shown that Q and SARSA learners tend to behave qualitatively more similar
in comparison to the Actor-Critic learning dynamics. This characteristic results at
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least partly from the relatively low intensity of choice parameter β, controlling the
exploration-exploitation trade-off via a forgetting term in the temporal difference
errors. Under β →∞ the forgetting term vanishes and the SARSA learning dynamics
approach the Actor-Critic learning dynamics.
Overall the Actor-Critic learners have a tendency to enter confining behavior
profiles, due to their non-existing forgetting term. This characteristic leaves them
trapped at the edges of the behavior space. In contrast, Q and SARSA learners do
not show such learning behavior. Interestingly, this characteristic of the AC learners
turns out to be favorable in the two-state Prisoner’s Dilemma environment, where
they find the most rewarding solution in more cases compared to Q and SARSA,
but hinders the convergence to the fixed point solution in the two-state Matching
Pennies environment. Thus, the most favorable level of forgetting depends on the
environment. In order to tune the respective parameter β, the consideration that it
must come in the unit of [log behavior] / [reward] may be helpful.
The effect of the learning rate α has been demonstrated, adjusting the speed of
learning by controlling the amount of new information used in a behavior profile
update. Thereby, within limits, α functions as a time re-scaling. However, a
comparably large learning rate α might cause an overshooting phenomenon, hindering
the convergence to a fixed point. Instead, the learners enter a limit cycle around
that point. Nevertheless, the average reward of the limit cycling behavior was
approximately equal to the one of the fixed point obtained at lower α, but took
fewer time steps to reach. Thus, perhaps other dynamical regimes than fixed points,
such as limit cycles or strange attractors, could be of interest in some applications of
reinforcement learning.
The effect of the discount factor γ was also demonstrated, adjusting the farsight-
edness of the agents. At low γ the state transition probabilities have less effect on
the learning dynamics compared to high discount factors.
To summarize the three parameters α, β and γ: the level of exploitation β and
the farsightedness γ control where the learner adapts towards in behavior space,
weighting current reward, expected future reward and the level of forgetting. The
learning rate α controls how fast the learner adapts along these directions.
Outlook. This work might turn out useful for the application of reinforcement
learning in various domains, with respect to parameter tuning, the design of new
algorithms, and the analysis of complex strategic interactions using meta strategies,
as Bloembergen et al. (2015) have pointed out. In this regard, future work could
extend the presented methodology to partial observability of the Markov states of
the environment (Oliehoek, 2012; Spaan, 2012), behavior profiles with history, and
other-regarding agent (i.e. joint-action) learners (c.f. Busoniu et al. (2008) for an
overview of other-regarding agent learning algorithms). Also, the combination of
individual reinforcement learning and social learning through imitation (Bandura,
1977; Banisch and Olbrich, 2018; Barfuss et al., 2017, P1; Smolla et al., 2015) seems
promising. Such endeavors would naturally lead to the exploration of network effects.
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It is important to note that only a few dynamical systems reinforcement learning
studies have begun to incorporate network structures between agents (Bladon and
Galla, 2011; Realpe-Gomez et al., 2012).
Apart from these more technical extensions, these learning equations may turn
out useful when studying the evolution of cooperation in stochastic games (Hilbe
et al., 2018). With stochastic games one is able to explicitly account for a changing
environment. Therefore, such studies are likely to contribute to the advancement of
theoretical research on the sustainability of coupled social-ecological systems (Donges
et al., 2017; Levin, 2013). Interactions, synergies and trade-offs between social
(Dawes, 1980; Macy and Flache, 2002) and ecological (Heitzig et al., 2016) dilemmas
can be explored using the framework of stochastic games. More realistic environments,
studied with the derived learning equations, are likely to prove themselves useful
in order to investigate the preconditions for sustainability: e.g. the harvesting
of a common-pool renewable resource (Lindkvist and Norberg, 2014; Schill et al.,
2015) or the prevention of dangerous climate change (Barrett and Dannenberg, 2012;
Milinski et al., 2008). In this spirit, the next chapter will apply the derived learning
equations to a particular social-ecological dilemma setting: the Ecological Public
Good, modeling a social-ecological tipping element.
Python code for the reproduction of the reported results is available at github:
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1495091.
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Second act: Cooperation in the ecological
public good
Zwischen mir und dem Krieg ist der Erdkern, Ich sehe durch
ihn hindurch. Wo noch Gras ist, sehe Ich das Gras von unten.
Die Welt ist durchschaubar.
Einstein - from Paul Dessau’s Einstein: Second act
Chapter 4 derived a deterministic limit of established so-called temporal difference
reinforcement learning equations. They enable a dynamical systems perspective on
the learning in multi-state environments, where the rewards of the agents depend
not only on all actions but also on the current environmental state transition.
In the following chapter these derived learning dynamics will be applied to a
particular environment, modeling an interlinked social-ecological dilemma. This envi-
ronment, hereby called the Ecological Public Good (EcoPG), extends the established
social dilemma public good by an environmental tipping element.
The Ecological Public Good within the framework of the agent-environment
interface for the investigation of social-ecological systems combines two previously
studied topics: i) the emergence of cooperation in stochastic games, and ii) so-called
collective risk dilemmas, a particular class of games to study the cooperation for the
mitigation of dangerous climate change. Due to the learning formalism presented
in Chapter 4 results can be derived numerically as well as analytically. Thus, three
qualitatively different parameter regimes could be identified with respect to the
emergence of cooperation, depending on the parameters farsightedness, collapse risk
and collapse damage.
In light of increasing political polarization this chapter asks for the stability
of a cooperation agreement when one of the participating actors puts less weight
on expected future gains. It can be shown that cooperation can remain stable
despite considerable shortsightedness, but only if this actor’s leverage to collapse the
environment is large and if the expected negative impact due to the collapse is high.
Conversely, this model projects that an actor who does not believe in likely and severe
consequences of a tipping catastrophe will break off the cooperation agreement.
This chapter contains unpublished material. However, an independent publication
based on the material presented in this chapter is planned (Barfuss et al., in prep.,
P8).
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5.1 Introduction
Collective human action is required to steer the Earth system away from potential
thresholds and stabilize it in a habitable state (Steffen et al., 2018), below planetary
boundaries (Rockström et al., 2009b; Steffen et al., 2015a) and simultaneously above
social foundations (Griggs et al., 2013; Raworth, 2017). In order to enter such a
safe and just operating space (Raworth, 2012; Rockström et al., 2009a), social and
ecological systems must not be studied in isolation, but as coupled social-ecological
systems (Berkes and Folke, 1998). This is important to capture the potentially
unexpected non-linear dynamics of self-reinforcing feedbacks between the ecological
and the social sphere.
Conceptually, entering such a safe and just operating space means finding ways to
overcome interlinked social and ecological dilemmas. A social dilemma is typically
defined as a situation in which any individual prefers the socially defecting choice,
regardless of what the other individuals choose. Yet, all individuals are better off if
all choose the socially cooperative option (Dawes, 1980; Hardin, 1968). Ecological
dilemmas are less uniformly defined. The choice of weighting current with expected
future rewards (see e.g. Stern, 2008) presents an especially prominent ecological
dilemma. Other ecological dilemmas have been shown to exist between the desirability,
safety and flexibility of an outcome and management options (Heitzig et al., 2016) as
well as the choice on an appropriate paradigm for environmental governance (Barfuss
et al., 2018, P4; Heitzig et al., 2018, P3).
Social dilemmas have often been investigated using the framework of repeated
normal form games (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Bladon and Galla, 2011; Macy
and Flache, 2002; Nowak, 2006; Szolnoki et al., 2009) proposing direct reciprocity in
the form of repeated interactions as one way to foster the evolution of cooperation.
However, the setting of repeated normal form games assumes a static environment
and is therefore not suited to incorporate ecological dilemmas.
This chapter proposes the evolution of cooperation in stochastic games (Hilbe
et al., 2018) as a framework for studying how coupled social-ecological dilemmas
can be resolved. Stochastic games (Neyman and Sorin, 2003; Shapley, 1953) extend
repeated normal form games by incorporating multiple environmental states. States
can affect the agents’ available actions, observations and current rewards. Transitions
between states depend on chosen actions and generally occur probabilistically. In
particular, Hilbe et al. (2018) use numerical simulations to find that agents require a
sufficiently large farsightedness for cooperation to emerge in a stochastic game (c.f.
Chapter 4, especially Fig. 4.9).
In this chapter, a particular stochastic game is introduced, termed the Ecological
Public Good (EcoPG; see Fig. 5.1 and detailed description below). It extends the
established public good by an environmental tipping element. Defection in the
EcoPG is not only associated with the socially sub-optimal outcome but also with a
probability to collapse the environment into a degraded state. In this degraded state
agents can only receive a negative environmental impact payoff. From the degraded
state only the cooperation action opens the chance to recover to the prosperous state.
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Threshold public good games or likewise collective-risk social dilemmas are similar
approaches to model catastrophic tipping (Barrett and Dannenberg, 2012; Barrett and
Dannenberg, 2013; Dannenberg et al., 2014; Milinski et al., 2008; Tavoni et al., 2011;
Vasconcelos et al., 2014; Walker and Gardner, 1992). Thus, through a behavioral
experiment Milinski et al. (2008) find that cooperation requires a sufficiently large risk
of collapse as well as a sufficiently large impact. However, in contrast to the EcoPG
those games typically do not consider a recovery after the collapse has occurred.
Yet, the EcoPG can been regarded as a generalization of these games. Letting the
recovery probability parameter of the EcoPG approach zero resembles their situation.
Further, the EcoPG is a comparable simple environment, using the framework of
repeated interactions within a stochastic game. Extending environments within
this framework allows the investigation of other, more complicated situations, as
e.g. Leibo et al. (2017), Lindkvist and Norberg (2014), Lindkvist et al. (2017), and
Pérolat et al. (2017) have done by using algorithmic reinforcement learning.
This chapter will investigate the EcoPG environment with the derived multi-state
learning equations of Chapter 4. With respect to the emergence of cooperation a
critical minimum farsightedness for each point in behavior phase space is derived,
which is required for the agents to have to learn the cooperation agreement. Con-
versely, there may exist points in behavior space from which individual learners
cannot reach the cooperation solution, since the farsightedness parameter is bounded.
This situation describes one of three qualitatively different parameter regimes, that
could be identified with respect to the parameters farsightedness, collapse risk and
collapse damage.
The resolution of the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement on
climate change can be regarded as an agreement to cooperate towards a sustainable
future. Yet in light of increasing political polarization (Dunlap et al., 2016) this
chapter specifically asks for the stability of such a cooperation agreement, when one
of the participating parties puts less weight on expected future gains. It can be shown
that cooperation can remain stable despite considerable shortsightedness, but only if
this agent’s leverage to collapse the environment and the negative collapse impact
are large. Conversely, this model projects that an actor, who does not believe in
likely and severe consequences of a tipping catastrophe, will break off the cooperation
agreement.
Sec. 5.2 introduces the Ecological Public Good and presents analytical results
based on the learning equations derived in Chapter 4. Sec. 5.3 discusses the results
before a summary closes this chapter in Sec. 5.4.
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Figure 5.1: Ecological Public Good
(shown for N = 2 agents) extends
the repeated public good game to a
stochastic game with two environmen-
tal states: In the prosperous state the
agents play a standard public good
game, in the degraded state agents
have to endure an environmental col-
lapse impact mi. State transition de-
pend on the joint actions, occur prob-
abilistically and are visualized with
black arrows. To simplify the presen-
tation, it is assumed that collapse and
recovery leverages qic ≤ 1 and qir ≤ 1,
for both i = 1, 2.
5.2 Model and methods
5.2.1 The ecologcial public good
The Ecological Public Good (EcoPG) extends the public good normal form game to
a stochastic game with two environmental states s ∈ S = {p, g}: a prosperous and a
degraded one. In each state s each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , N} can choose an action from
its action set ai ∈ Ai = {c, d}: cooperation and defection. Fig. 5.1 illustrates the
model for N = 2 agents.
Rewards Risas′ follow the normal public good in the prosperous state:
Ripaia−ip =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
rcNcN − c if ai = c
rcNcN if ai = d
. (5.1)
where c denotes the cost of cooperation, r the cooperation synergy factor and Nc
the number of cooperating agents in the current time step. All cooperating agents
contribute the cooperation cost to the public good, which gets multiplied by the
synergy factor and is then distributed to all agents. Thus, for the special case of
58
5.2 Model and methods
N = 2 agents the payoff matrix reads⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝R
1
pccp R
1
pcdp
R1pdcp R
1
pddp
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝rc− c rc/2− c
rc/2 0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝rr rs
rt rp
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ . (5.2)
Written in Prisoner’s Dilemma form rr = rc − c denotes the cooperation reward,
rt = rc/2 the temptation reward, rs = rc/2− c the sucker’s reward and rp = 0 the
punishment reward. Likewise, the rewards for agent 2 in the prosperous state read⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝R
1
pccp R
2
pcdp
R1pdcp R
2
pddp
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝ rc− c rc/2
rc/2− c 0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝rr rt
rs rp
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ . (5.3)
However, when a state transition involves the degraded state g, the agents only
receive an environmental collapse impact mi:
Ripag = Rigag = Rigap = mi, for all a. (5.4)
State transitions from the prosperous to the degraded state occur with probability
Tpag = min
(
1,
N∑
i=1
δdai
qic
N
)
, (5.5)
where qic is the leverage of agent i to collapse the environment under the defective
action, expressed by the Kronecker delta δdai . The total collapse probability is
maximal one or else the sum of individual collapse contributions. The leverage qic
is parameterized such that a value of qic = 1 for all agents i would make a collapse
exactly certain if all agents were defecting. For all joint actions a the probability to
remain in the prosperous state must be Tpap = 1− Tpag.
Similarly, for state transitions from the degraded to the prosperous state, a recovery
leverage qir is associated to the cooperative action. They give the total recovery
probability according to
Tgap = min
(
1,
N∑
i=1
δcai
qir
N
)
. (5.6)
Hence, the probability to remain in the degraded state is given by Tgag = 1− Tgap
for all joint actions a.
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5.2.2 Emergence of cooperation
First, the emergence of cooperation is investigated when agents individually learn
through reinforcements according to the learning equations derived in Chapter 4.
Specifically of interest are the preconditions for successful cooperation with respect
to the agents’ initial behavior, their farsightedness, collapse leverage and impact. To
make the calculations feasible, the special case of N = 2 agents is considered.
As shown in Chapter 4, the relative temporal difference error arrows are pointing
in the behavior phase space direction towards the next behavior the agents learn.
Here, the ansatz is assumed that cooperation will be eventually obtained if these
arrows are pointing more towards the cooperative solution than to the detective
solution. Or in other words, if an initial change of behavior will increase overall
cooperation probability, the agents will end up cooperating. Thus, this ansatz can be
seen as an approximation of first order. How well it works remains to be investigated.
To obtain the hypersurface in behavior space dividing this cooperative from the
defective basin of attraction following this ansatz, one has to search for behavior
profiles X under which the temporal difference errors are pointing neither to the
cooperative nor to the defective solution. Mathematically this can be expressed as
TD1pc(X)− TD1pd(X) != −
(
TD2pc(X)− TD2pd(X)
)
. (5.7)
This equation is solved with the help of a computer algebra program (Meurer et al.,
2017), since inserting the behavior profile X, the reward and transition tensors, R
and T into the temporal difference errors in Eq. 5.7 and subsequent terms within
those temporal difference errors (see Chapter 4) yields an expression, unpractical
to handle by hand. To make the calculation feasible only the prosperous state is
considered, under the assumption that agents have a uniformly random behavior
in the degraded state (X1gc = X2gc = 0.5). Additionally, the analysis is focused on
Actor-Critic learning, or equivalently on SARSA learning under the assumption of
a sufficiently large exploitation level β. Doing so eases the calculation because the
forgetting term either does not exist (in the case of Actor-Critic learning, Eq. 4.14)
or vanishes under β →∞ (in the case of SARSA learning, Eq. 4.12). Not considering
the forgetting term here is justified because it favors neither the cooperative nor the
defective solution. The forgetting term in the temporal difference error favors the
center of behavior space (X1pc = X2pc = 0.5). The cooperative as well as the defective
solution lie at edge (X1pc = X2pc = 1 or X1pc = X2pc = 0).
Using a computer algebra program one is able to solve Eq. 5.7 for X2pc as a function
of X1pc, depending on the model’s parameters (see Secs. 5.3). Assuming homogeneous
agents with identical parameters Eq. 5.7 can be solved for e.g. the farsightedness γ
(Sec. 5.3.1) or the environmental collapse impact m (Sec. 5.3.2). Agent-indices of
the parameters will be omitted for homogeneous agents. Likewise, wherever model
parameters occur with omitted agent-indices parameter-homogeneous agents are
considered.
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5.2.3 Stability of cooperation
Having reached the cooperative solution, now its stability is investigated, assuming
heterogeneous agents. Specifically, the preconditions for stable cooperation with
respect to a single agent’s farsightedness, collapse leverage and impact are of interest.
Without loss of generality, the heterogeneous agent is denoted by agent 1. To obtain
the analytical solution for the edge of the cooperation region in the parameter space
of agent 1 the following ansatz is assumed: cooperation must be as attractive as
defection to the agent in the propsperous state:
TD1pc(cX)
!= TD1pd(cX) (5.8)
with the behavior profile cXisc → 1, for all i, s, since the agents are close to the
cooperative solution in all states.
As above, the focus is put on Actor-Critic learning or SARSA learning with a
sufficiently large level of exploitation β1. The remaining terms in the temporal
difference errors (Eqs. 4.12 and 4.14, respectively) left to calculate are the reward
TX−i⟨R⟩1sa
⏐⏐
X=cX and the value of the next state
nextV1sa(cX). To simplify the presen-
tation, it is assumed that collapse and recovery leverages are not exceeding the value
1: (q1r + q2r )/2 ≤ 1 and q1c ≤ 1.
Inserting reward and transition tensors as given above in Prisoner’s Dilemma form
into the behavioral and temporal average TX−i⟨...⟩ as defined in Eqs. 3.5 and 3.6
yields⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
TX−i⟨R⟩1pc TX−i⟨R⟩1pd
TX−i⟨R⟩1gc TX−i⟨R⟩1gd
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐
X=cX
=
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
rr
q1c
2 m
1 +
(
1− q1c2
)
rt
m1 m1
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ . (5.9)
Likewise, using the reward and transition tensor as given above in Prisoner’s Dilemma
form to compute the next value according to Eq. 4.13 yields⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
nextV1pc(cX) nextV1pd(cX)
nextV1gc(cX) nextV1gd(cX)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
V 1p (cX)
q1c
2 V
1
g (cX) +
(
1− q1c2
)
V 1p (cX)
q1r+q2r
2 V
1
p (cX) +
(
1− q1r+q2r2
)
V 1g (cX)
q2r
2 V
1
p (cX) +
(
1− q2r2
)
V 1g (cX)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ ,
(5.10)
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with the state values⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
V 1p (cX)
V 1g (cX)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
rr
q1r+q
2
r
2 γ
1rr+(1−γ1)m1
1−
(
1− q1r+q2r2
)
γ1
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ . (5.11)
Inserting these results into the ansatz expressed in Eq. 5.8 one obtains implicitly
after rearranging
rˆt − rˆr = qˆ
1
c
2
[
rˆt − mˆ1 + γˆ
1
1− γˆ1(1− pˆtotr )
(rˆr − mˆ1)
]
(5.12)
with pˆtotr = (qˆ1r + qˆ2r )/2. Interestingly, the only parameter of agent 2 occurring in
Eq. 5.12 is its recovery leverage q2r . This is because the learners are independent, in
the sense that they do not take into account expected future actions of other agents.
Thus, Eq. 5.12 describes agent 1’s deliberations when it is equally prone to remain
in and to break off the cooperation agreement. It describes the edge of the stable
cooperation regime in the parameter space of agent 1. The reward difference between
the temptation and cooperation reward (rt − rr) must equal the collapse probability
in the case of agent 1’s defection (q1c/2) multiplied by the reward difference between
the temptation reward and the collapse impact rt −m1 plus the discounted expected
future reward difference between the cooperation reward and the collapse impact
γ1
1−γ1(1−ptotr )(rr −m
1). Eq. 5.12 nicely demonstrates that there is no distinct reward
value and that only reward differences are of interest to the agent.
Note that the stability concept presented here results directly from the dynamical
perspective brought forth by the self-learning agents. A comparison to related
concepts, such as classic game theoretic equilibria in stochastic games (see e.g.
Neyman and Sorin, 2003) may be of interested for future work, is however beyond
the scope and focus of this chapter.
5.3 Discussion of results
5.3.1 Critical farsightedness
First, the dependence of the emergence of cooperation on the farsightedness γ for
parameter-homogeneous agents is considered. In the degraded state rewards are
incidental for all actions. Only the cooperation action will eventually lead back to
the prosperous state with higher rewards. Thus, agents easily learn to cooperate in
the degraded state (Fig. 5.2 a-c).
In the prosperous state, however, it depends on the initial behavior profile and the
farsightedness γ of the agents, whether or not they will learn to cooperate or defect.
From the ansatz expressed in Eq. 5.7 one can compute the critical discount factor γcrit
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Figure 5.2: Critical farsightedness in behavior space. (a-c) The arrows indicate the average
direction the learning dynamics drive the parameter-homogeneous agents towards for each
state, averaged over all behavior space points of the other state for different farsightedness γ.
The algebraic solutions where these arrows have x,y components of equal length but different
sign are shown in red. This ansatz is able to divide the behavior space in a cooperation and a
defection basin of attraction, as exemplary trajectories, shown in gray, indicate. Remaining
parameters are r = 1.2, c = 5,m = −1.5, qc = 0.8, qr = 0.1. The critical farsightedness γcrit
from this ansatz is shown in the behavior space section of the prosperous state (d). From an
arbitrary point in behavior space both agents need a farsightedness of at least γcrit to learn
the cooperative solution. Thus, from the black area there is no such farsightedness since γ is
confined by 1.
in behavior space above which agents will learn to cooperate (Fig. 5.2 d). Fig. 5.2 a-c
nicely confirms this ansatz. The red lines resulting from Eq. 5.7 are indeed capable
to separate the behavior space into a cooperative and a defective basin of attraction
as individual learning trajectories in gray show. This result is in line with previous
findings that cooperation needs a sufficiently large farsightedness (Hilbe et al., 2018).
Yet, with the approach taken here it is possible to assign a critical farsightedness
γcrit to every point in behavior space. Only with farsightedness parameters equal
or greater than this critical value, cooperation will emerge. Interestingly, Fig. 5.2
d shows an area (in black) in behavior space from which the cooperation solution
cannot be obtained by the individual reinforcement learners, regardless of their
farsightedness γ ∈ [0, 1).
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Figure 5.3: Three regimes for the learning of cooperation from full defection. (a) For
parameter-homogeneous agents the ansatz Eq. 5.7 , solved for the environmental collapse
impact parameter m is plotted against the collapse risk leverage qc for different values of
farsightedness γ. The behavior profile was set to full defection in the prosperous state
(X1pc = X2pc = 0). Thus, in environments with damage parameters (m, qc) below the curves,
agents with a farsightedness γ at least as large as denoted by the curves, will learn to cooperate
from an all defect solution. Behavior space sections are shown for three parameter combinations
of qc,m, γ (b-d). The arrows indicate the average direction the learning dynamics drive the
agents towards for each state, averaged over all behavior space points of the other state.
Similar as in Fig. 5.2 a-c, the ansatz Eq. 5.7 is shown in behavior space as red lines. Example
learning trajectories are shown in gray. Remaining parameters are r = 1.2, c = 5, qr = 0.1.
5.3.2 Learning to cooperate from full defection
Under what conditions does such a, metaphorically speaking, black hole for the
learning dynamics exit? It does not exist, if agents learn to cooperate even from
an initial behavior profile close to the all defect point in the behavior space of
the prosperous state. The ansatz described in Sec 5.2.2 with the all defect initial
conditions X1pc = X2pc = 0 is solved for the environmental collapse impact parameter
m and plotted against the collapse risk leverage qc for different discount factors
γ (Fig. 5.3 a). Thus, damage parameter combinations (m, qc) right from or below
the curves shown in Fig. 5.3 a designate environmental conditions in which agents
with a farsightedness γ of at least as large as marked by the respective curve will
learn to fully cooperate, even from an initial all defect behavior in the prosperous
state. Conversely, in environments with damage parameter combinations (m, qc)
left from or above these curves, the learning agents with less farsightedness as
marked by the respective curve, will remain at the all defect behavior. Fig. 5.3
b-d confirms this relation by showing exemplary behavior phase spaces for three
parameter combinations. Fig. 5.3 b and c only differ in their discount factor. The
environmental damage point (qc = 0.4,m = −4.5) lies between the curves associated
to discount factors γ = 0.6 and γ = 0.9. In such environments the ansatz expressed
64
5.3 Discussion of results
in Eq. 5.7 predicts that agents with a farsightedness of at least γ = 0.9 learn to
cooperate even from the all defect solution, as shown in Fig. 5.3 a. Fig. 5.3 b nicely
confirms this prediction. Yet, agents with a farsightedness of γ < 0.6 are predicted
to not learn to cooperate from full defection, as Fig. 5.3 c confirms as well. They
might, however, learn to cooperate from more cooperative initial conditions.
Interestingly, the bounded parameter γ ∈ [0, 1) divides this environmental damage
parameter space into three regimes: i) Left from or above the dashed curve in dark
red, marking γ = 1, is the area in which such a black hole, as shown in Fig. 5.2,
exists. Even agents with close to absolute farsightedness will not escape the all defect
behavior. ii) The area enclosed by the two dashed lines describes environmental
damage parameter combinations (m, qc) for which there exist discount factors γ, such
that the agents will learn to cooperate from the initial all defect behavior. iii) Right
from or below the dashed curve in light right, marking γ = 0, is the area for which
agents learn to cooperate from the defective behavior, regardless of the discount
factor. This is true even for discount factors γ → 0, as Fig. 5.3 d nicely confirms.
Agents will learn to cooperate regardless of their farsightedness, if the risk through
the leverage to collapse the environment qc and the collapse impact in the degraded
state m are both sufficiently large.
Fig. 5.3 a suggests that the relationship between collapse impact and risk leverage
is dominated by an m ∝ 1/qc term. Bringing qc on the other side yields the expected
collapse impact qcm, influencing the agents’ learning. This result is in line with
previous findings from experimental threshold public good games, reporting that a
large expected damaging impact is beneficial for cooperation (Milinski et al., 2008).
Yet, through the approach taken here it is possible to derive analytical dependencies
between the involved parameters, based on the assumption of individual learning
agents.
As qc = 1, the curves in Fig. 5.3 a do not depend on γ. This is intuitively
explainable. If immediate collapse is certain under the defective action, the agents
do not require farsightedness. Conversely, for decreasing collapse leverages qc, the
γ-dependence increases.
With respect to the range of collapse impact values, Fig. 5.3 a shows that above a
value of m = −2, i.e. less negative impact in the case of collapse, there exists always
a black hole regime, regardless of the collapse leverage qc. This value m = −2 is
exactly equal to the sucker’s payoff rs = rc/2− c = −2 for the parameters as chosen
in Fig. 5.3. Thus, if the equally distributed collapse impact m is slightly better than
the unequally distributed suffering due to exploitation rs, i.e. m > rs, agents close
to the defective behavior will not learn to cooperate, even if collapse is certain.
5.3.3 Stability of cooperation
After examining the preconditions for the emergence of cooperation, this section
now discusses its stability. Specifically of interest here is the stability of cooperation
when one agent changes its characteristics, e.g. its attitude towards expected future
rewards or its expected impact in the case of collapse. In other words, this section
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Figure 5.4: Stability of cooperation for heterogeneous agents. The parameter space shown
(c) is spanned by the farsightedness γ1 and the collapse propensity q1c of agent 1. The color
indicates the level of cooperation after the learning has converged from an initial level of
cooperation of Xisc = 0.99 for all agents (i = 1, 2) and all states (s = p, g). The analytical
solution is shown in blue (Eq. 5.12), which is in good accordance with the numerical learning.
The behavior spaces of two parameter examples are shown (a,b), one from the cooperation
stable region, one from the cooperation brake off region. The analytical solution for different
levels of environmental collapse impact m1 of agent 1 shows that a larger impact −m1 is
beneficial for cooperation (d). Remaining parameters are r = 1.2, c = 5,m1 = m2 = −1.5,
q2c = 0.8, q1r = q2r = 0.1, γ2 = 0.8, if not specified otherwise.
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highlights the parameter space of agent 1 with respect to the parameter combinations
under which the cooperation solution remains stable, or under which combinations
agent 1 breaks off the cooperation agreement. As shown with Eq. 5.12, the stability
of cooperation depends only on agent 1’s discount factor γ1, collapse risk leverage q1c
and collapse impact m1 and the overall recovery probability, and does not depend
on the respective parameters of the other agent.
Depending on the these parameters of agent 1, cooperation either remains stable or
breaks down (Fig. 5.4). Fig. 5.4a,b shows how the dynamics in behavior space become
asymmetric with respect to the angle bisector due to the agents’ heterogeneity. The
red lines result from the same ansatz as in Fig. 5.2, separating the cooperative from
the defective basin of attraction. Fig. 5.4 c compares numerical simulations with
the analytical solution of the stability separating line in parameter space (Eq. 5.12).
They are in good accordance, justifying the assumptions made in Sec. 5.2.3. Fig. 5.4
c shows that cooperation can remain stable despite agent 1 having comparable small
farsightedness. Even if agent 1 is not caring for the future at all (γ1 = 0), cooperation
can remain stable. In this case the stability diving line in parameter space (Eq. 5.12)
reduces to rˆt − rˆr = qˆ1c/2 · [rˆt − mˆ1]. Cooperation remains stable if the expected
reward difference between the temptation reward rt and the environmental impact
m1 in the case of collapse (q1c/2) is greater than the reward difference between the
temptation rt and the cooperation reward rr. Thus, for large collapse leverages q1c and
likewise large damage impacts −m1 cooperation remains stable, even if the agent’s
farsightedness γ1 = 0. Fig. 5.4 d confirms for all γi that the greater the suffering the
agent has to endure in the case of collapse the larger the stable region in its parameter
space. On the other hand Eq. 5.12 suggests that if the collapse leverage q1c = 0 there
is no parameter combination that keeps the cooperation agreement stable. This is
because Eq. 5.12 reduces to rˆt − rˆr = 0 in this case. Yet, from the definition of a
social dilemma rt > rr must hold. Thus, rt − rr ≤ 0 cannot be fulfilled leaving the
cooperation solution unstable. This result is intuitively explainable, because if there
is no collapse risk leverage q1c = 0, at least for agent 1, the game reduces to a classic
social dilemma with a dominating defection solution.
To summarize, an individual learning agent with low collapse leverage or likewise
low expected damaging impact is more likely to break off the cooperation agreement
because in its deliberations it comes to the conclusion that its own actions will not
have sufficiently severe consequences, and therefore defection seems the favorable
choice.
5.4 Summary
This chapter introduced a novel environment, termed the Ecological Public Good. It
extends the established social dilemma public good game by an environmental tipping
element. This environment thereby represents a stylized coupled social-ecological
dilemma.
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The emergence and stability of cooperation in the EcoPG were analyzed by apply-
ing the individual reinforcement learning equations derived in Chapter 4. Specifically,
this chapter focused on the relationship between two previously unconnected charac-
teristics: the agents’ farsightedness, weighting current with expected future rewards
for a learning behavior update; and the environment’s expected damage to the agents
in the case of collapse. For each characteristic individually, previous theoretical or
empirical findings could be reproduced.
Overall, this chapter demonstrates the usefulness of agent-environment interface
model designs for advancing the mathematics of sustainability (Levin, 2013). Using
the derived learning equations in Chapter 4, it was possible to present analytical
results for the preconditions of both, the emergence and stability of cooperation.
With respect to the emergence of cooperation, computer-algebraic analytical results
were shown, assigning a critical farsightedness to each point in behavior space, above
which cooperation emerges. Further, the existence of a black hole regime in behavior
space was demonstrated, from which there is no farsightedness, such that the agents
would be able to learn the cooperative solution. Agents prefer to collectively suffer in
environmental collapse rather than cooperating in a prosperous environment. This
is an interlinked social-ecological dilemma, presenting an interesting challenge for
future research: Is it possible to design non-trivial learning equations, that find the
cooperative solution from this regime?
It was shown that such a black hole exits regardless of the collapse risk if the
impact due to environmental collapse is less severe than the suffering due to being
exploited in the social dilemma.
Concerning the parameter relationship between the risk to collapse the environment,
the level of environmental impact in the case of collapse, and the farsightness of the
agents, three regimes with respect to the learning of cooperation could be identified:
i) an always cooperate regime, in which risk and damage are so large, that the agents
will learn to cooperate, regardless of their farsightedness; ii) a farsightedness regime,
where it depends on the farsightedness of the agents, whether they learn to cooperate
from a full defection initial behavior; and iii) the black hole regime, where these
agents are not able to learn to cooperate from full defection, even if they have full
farsightedness.
With respect to the stability of cooperation for heterogeneous agents, i.e. when
one agent changes its parameters, it was shown through analytical and numerical
calculations that an individual learner can keep the cooperation solution stable
despite considerable shortsightedness. However, this is only the case if its leverage to
collapse the environment and the expected damage in the case of collapse are large.
Since cooperation can remain stable even when the agent has no farsightedness at
all, but not if the collapse leverage vanishes, one may conclude, that the expected
collapse damage due to the actors own action is of greater importance than the
actor’s farsightedness. Thus, an actor who does not believe in likely and severe
consequences of a tipping catastrophe will break off the cooperation agreement.
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Outlook. The learning agents used in this chapter are individual incremental reward-
maximizing learners. Thus, they do not take into account any expected future actions
of other agents. The effect of such more complicated learners (c.f Busoniu et al.,
2008) on both, the emergence and stability of cooperation, is of great interest for
future work. For example, it has been shown in a related setting that higher levels
of strategic reasoning can make cooperation agreements unstable (Verendel et al.,
2015).
Likewise of great interest is the relevance of the agents’ reward-maximizing
paradigm within the learning equations. Optimization approaches for environmental
governance have been criticized for delivering short-term gains at the expense of
long-term environmental degradation. This is why the next chapter will perform a
systematic comparison of a reward optimization decision paradigm with two other
important decision paradigms for environmental governance: sustainability and the
safe operating space.
Python code for the reproduction of the reported results is available upon request by the author.
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Chapter 6
Third act: Decision paradigms for the
governance of tipping elements
Jeder muß bereit sein, sich einsperren und wirtschaftlich
ruinieren zu lassen; wenn sich genug Personen finden,
die diesen harten Weg gehen, werden wir Erfolg haben.
Bulle 1 - from Paul Dessau’s Einstein: Third act
The learning equations derived in Chapter 4 follow a reward-optimization paradigm.
Yet, optimization approaches for environmental governance have been criticized for
delivering short-term gains at the expense of long-term environmental degradation.
It is thus of importance to asses the effects of such decision paradigms for the
preconditions to enter sustainable pathways. Prominent alternative paradigms to
derive behaviors or likewise policies from are sustainability and the safe operating
space.
This chapter will systematically compare these three decision paradigms for the
management of a tipping element environment, which can be regarded as the special
case of a single agent in the Ecological Public Good, as introduced in Chapter 5. Since
the reinforcement learning dynamics result directly from the reward-optimization
approach, there are no equivalent learning dynamics for the other paradigms. There-
fore, no learning is used in this chapter and policies (equivalent to behaviors) are
derived directly from the respective decision paradigms.
It can be shown that optimization can lead to sustainable and safe policies but
is by no means guaranteed to do so. In fact, no paradigm guarantees fulfilling
requirements imposed by another paradigm. This chapter presents simple heuristics
for the conditions under which these trade-offs occur. Further, it demonstrates that
the absence of such a master paradigm is of special relevance for governing the
climate system, which may reside at edge in the parameter space where economic
optimization becomes neither sustainable nor safe.
This chapter is based on (Barfuss et al., 2018, P4).
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6.1 Introduction
The Sustainable Development Goals (UN General Assembly, 2015) and the adoption
of the Paris Agreement on climate change (COP, 2015) set the target of prosperous
development for people and the planet. Yet, it remains challenging to translate these
aims into concrete policy implementations, accounting for non-linearities, such as
tipping elements (Lenton et al., 2008; Schellnhuber, 2009), regime shifts (Lade et al.,
2013; Scheffer et al., 2001), and multi-stabilities (Donges et al., 2017) as well as
multiple kinds of uncertainties (Anderies et al., 2007; Irwin et al., 2016; Polasky
et al., 2011a), and extreme events (Farmer et al., 2015).
Optimization approaches have emerged as the primary guiding principle to derive a
policy strategy for environmental governance (Perman et al., 2003; Weyant, 2014).
Most often, the present value of macroeconomic social welfare, i.e. the sum of
discounted future benefits minus costs, is the target to be optimized. Such optimiza-
tion approaches have been criticized regarding the discount rates used, delivering
short term gains at the expense of long-term environmental degradation (Ackerman
et al., 2009; Stern, 2008). Further criticism targets the lack of a systems perspective
required to understand the structural landscape of model dynamics, as well as the
assumptions made due to imperfect information (Donges et al., 2017; Farmer et al.,
2015; Irwin et al., 2016). This critique is partly dealt with in optimization variants,
such as robust (Anderies et al., 2007; Woodward and Tomberlin, 2014) or viable
(De Lara and Doyen, 2008; Martinet and Doyen, 2007; Rougé et al., 2013) control,
which are dealing with multiple types of uncertainty (Chadès et al., 2016). Naturally,
other or multiple objectives (Branke et al., 2008) and criteria (Ehrgott, 2000; Greco
et al., 2016) with possible constraints (Altman, 1999) can be optimized as well. In
this work, the term is used solely in the narrow economic sense of maximizing the
present value as defined in Eq. 6.9 below.
Sustainability. In recognition of increasing environmental and social threats (Mead-
ows et al., 1972) the policy paradigm of sustainability has emerged in the scientific
and political discourse (Pezzey, 1992; WCED, 1987). The economics of sustain-
ability has brought up many definitions of sustainability alone (Arrow et al., 2012;
Fleurbaey, 2015; Gerlagh, 2017; Pezzey, 1997). In these analyses sustainability is
usually imposed as a constraint within an economic welfare optimization paradigm.
Trade-offs to economic welfare optimization are well known (Pezzey, 1997, 2004).
However, these classic social welfare optimization approaches are challenged through
the increasing recognition of non-linearities, such as tipping points, regime shifts,
uncertainties and the risk of catastrophic outcomes (Donges et al., 2017; Irwin et al.,
2016). Taking up these challenges, e.g. non-convexities (Dasgupta and Mäler, 2004)
and climate tipping elements (Cai et al., 2016; Lontzek et al., 2015) have been studied
within an economic framework. In this chapter, the formal definition of sustainability
is derived from the Brundtland report (WCED, 1987). Its design is deliberately
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simple and targeted to the mathematical framework used (see below). This definition
is not intended to be applicable to a general model of a welfare economy (Perman
et al., 2003; Pezzey, 1992).
Safe operating space. Recent advances in sustainability science have brought forth
tolerable windows (Petschel-Held et al., 1999) or safe operating spaces (Dearing et al.,
2014; Rockström et al., 2009a) as a policy paradigm to derive concrete actions from
(Carpenter et al., 2015). These concepts originate from resilience thinking (Folke
et al., 2010) and a precautionary principle (Raffensperger and Tickner, 1999) to deal
with potential dangerous tipping elements in the environmental governance system.
Trade-offs but also synergies with optimization thinking have been discussed (Fischer
et al., 2009). Also formal analyses studying relations between resilience as a system
property and sustainability were conducted (Derissen et al., 2011; Mäler and Li,
2010).
Research challenge. However, the reciprocal relationships between these three
paradigms of economic optimization, sustainability and safe operating space is still
insufficiently explored. Such an understanding is important in order to judge, for
example, when economic optimization is, or is not, an appropriate policy goal. Also,
guidance is required when a sustainability paradigm may conflict with a safe operating
space paradigm and vice versa.
Overview. In this chapter progress is reported towards a better understanding of
the mutual relationships between these three paradigms of economic optimization,
sustainability and safe operating space by applying them to a single-agent tipping
element environment. This is done because of the increasing importance of tipping
points and regime shifts in environmental governance. The agent-environment
interface model is deliberately stylized, thereby applicable across multiple cases and
scales, to gain a deeper understanding more complex models might miss. The formal
definitions of the three paradigms are designed to fit the mathematical framework
(see below). Since there is no focus on intragenerational justice in this chapter, one
agent suffices as a decision making subject, in contrast to the multi-agent setting of
e.g. Chapter 5.
Sec. 6.2 describes the agent-environment tipping element, presents the formal
definitions of the three investigated governance paradigms and derives analytical
expressions for the paradigms classification of two relevant governance policies in the
parameter space of the model. Sec. 6.3 presents and discusses these results including
a qualitative comparison with the three real-world systems of climate, fisheries and
farming before this chapter concludes with a summary in Sec. 6.4
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Figure 6.1: Single-agent tipping element environment. (a) Agent-environment interface:
based on the state information and received reward, the agent chooses an action a from its
actions set to gain rewards. (b) The transition graph gives state transition probabilities and
corresponding rewards for all triples of state s, action a, next state s′, i.e. in state s the agent
takes action a and moves to state s′. (c) Risky and cautious policies including the resulting
Markov chains as a transition graph.
6.2 Model and methods
6.2.1 A single-agent tipping element environment
The special case of one agent (N = 1) reduces the multi-agent environment system,
as presented in Chapter 3 to a Markov decision processes (Bellman, 1957; Puterman,
2005), in which one agent makes decisions about how to interact with its environment
(Fig. 6.1 a). Like in the Ecological Public Good (EcoPG, Chapter 5), the particular
environment of this chapter can reside in either a prosperous state p, which provides
immediate rewards to the agent, or a degraded state g, from which the agent receives
no reward, i.e.
S = {p, g}. (6.1)
At each time step, the agent chooses between two actions a, exerting either a high
or low pressure on the environment, i.e.
A = {h, l}. (6.2)
Since there is only one agent, the EcoPG’s action names cooperation and defection
are potentially confusing. Also, agent identifiers in the superscript can be omitted.
At the prosperous state, taking the low pressure action the agent is guaranteed to
receive reward rl and remain at the prosperous state:
Rplp = rl; Tplp = 1. (6.3)
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However, the agent faces the dilemma that taking the high pressure action, it may
receive reward rh (which is typically larger than rl), but risks triggering a collapse of
the environment to the degraded system state with non-zero probability pc and no
immediate reward at all:
Rphp = rh, Tphp = 1− pc, (6.4)
Rphg = 0, Tphg = pc. (6.5)
From there, only the low pressure action opens the option to recover to the
prosperous state with non-zero probability pr,
Rglp = 0, Tglp = pr, (6.6)
Rglg = 0, Tglg = 1− pr, (6.7)
Rghg = 0, Tghg = 1. (6.8)
For example, the high pressure action could correspond to a technological optimistic
policy, emitting a business-as-usual amount of carbon to the atmosphere which yields
a reward of high, short-term economic output as long as the system has not tipped.
The low pressure action resembles emitting a reduced amount of carbon, assuming a
lower short-term economic output for the guarantee to not trigger climate tipping
elements into a disastrous state.
The agent chooses its action according to its policy X. Since this model is about
environmental governance X is referred to by policy instead of behavior. However,
mathematically X is used identically as introduced in Chapter 3.
Similarly as defined in Eq. 3.9 the value Vs(X) of a state s under a given policy X
is given by the expected value of the normalized accumulated discounted rewards
r(t) with discount factor or farsightedness 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 when starting in state s(0) = s
and following policy X:
Vs(X) = TX
⟨
lim
T→∞
∑T
t=0 γ
tr(t)∑T
t=0 γ
t
⏐⏐⏐⏐ s(0) = s
⟩
s
. (6.9)
6.2.2 Derivation of value functions
In the following section analytical expressions of the value functions (Eq. 6.9) are
derived when applied to the Markov decision process as described above. These are
needed for the definitions of the three governance paradigms.
There are four deterministic policies in this Markov decision process model:
1. the risky policy (rXph = 1, rXgl = 1),
applying the high pressure action at the prosperous state and the low pressure
action at the degraded state;
2. the cautious policy (cXpl = 1, cXgl = 1),
applying the low pressure action at the prosperous and the degraded state;
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3. the third policy (3Xph = 1, 3Xdh = 1),
applying the high pressure action at the prosperous and the degraded state;
and
4. the fourth policy (4Xpl = 1, 4Xgh = 1),
applying the low pressure action at the prosperous state and the high pressure
action at the degraded state.
It is sufficient to concentrate on deterministic policies, because if an optimal policy
exits there exits also a deterministic optimal policy (Puterman, 2005). Further,
the focus is put on the first two policies only, which were named the risky and the
cautious policy (Fig. 6.1 c) . The remaining two policies apply a high pressure action
at the degraded state, which will trap the agent at this position for eternity without
receiving any reward. The mathematics for these policies is left to the interested
reader.
In the following, the analytical expressions of the state values of these policies
will be derived as functions of the parameters (pc, pr, γ, rl, rh). Readers who are not
interested in the mathematical details may safely skip this section.
Case γ < 1
From Eq. 6.9 and for γ < 1 one can derive the recursive relationship between state
values, known as the Bellman equation (Bellman, 1957; see also Eq. 3.14):
Vs(X) =
∑
a
∑
s′
XsaTsas′ [(1− γ)Rsas′ + γVs′(X)] . (6.10)
Applied to the tipping model the value for the prosperous state reads
Vp(X) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
pcγVg(X) + (1− pc)[(1− γ)rh + γVp(X)] for Xph = 1
(1− γ)rl + γVp(X) for Xpl = 1
. (6.11)
The value for the degraded state is given by
Vg(X) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
γVg(X) for Xgh = 1
(1− pr)γVg(X) + prγVp(X) for Xgl = 1
. (6.12)
To obtain the explicit state values for the risky policy (rXph = 1, rXgl = 1) one
needs to solve the system of equations
Vp(rX) = pcγVg(rX) + (1− pc) [(1− γ)rh + γVp(rX)] (6.13)
Vg(rX) = (1− pr)γVg(rX) + prγVp(rX), (6.14)
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which yields
Vp(rX) = rh
(1− pc)(1− (1− pr)γ)
1− (1− pc − pr)γ (6.15)
Vg(rX) = rh
(1− pc)prγ
1− (1− pc − pr)γ . (6.16)
To obtain the explicit state values for the cautious policy (cXpl = 1, cXgl = 1) one
needs to solve the system of equations
Vp(cX) = (1− γ)rl + γVp(cX) (6.17)
Vg(cX) = (1− pr)γVg(cX) + prγVp(cX), (6.18)
which yields
Vp(cX) = rl (6.19)
Vg(cX) = rl
prγ
1− (1− pr)γ . (6.20)
Case γ = 1
For γ = 1 the values V (X) become independent from the initial state. One can
compute them by multiplying the stationary state σ(X) of the effective Markov
chain transition matrix X⟨T ⟩ss′ with the reward vector TX⟨R⟩:
V (X) = σ(X) · TX⟨R⟩ . (6.21)
Encoding the state vector with the prosperous state in the first and the degraded
state in the second dimension, the effective Markov transition matrix for the risky
policy reads
X⟨T⟩|X=rX =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝X⟨T ⟩pp X⟨T ⟩pg
X⟨T ⟩gp X⟨T ⟩gg
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐
X=rX
=
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝1− pc pc
pr 1− pr
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ . (6.22)
Its left eigenvector with eigenevalue one reads
σ(rX) =
(
σp(rX) σg(rX)
)
= 1
pc + pr
(pr pc) . (6.23)
Thus, for the risky policy the ratio of residence times (of the prosperous state over the
degraded state) equals the ratio of transition probabilities (of recovery over collapse).
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The reward receivable from each state reads
TX⟨R⟩|X=rX =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝TX⟨R⟩p
TX⟨R⟩g
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐
X=rX
=
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝(1− pc)rh
0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ . (6.24)
As one can easily see, evaluating V (X) = σ(X) · TX⟨R⟩ for the risky policy yields
consistent results with the calculation for 0 ≤ γ < 1 from above: The value V (X)
for the case γ = 1 is identical to inserting γ = 1 into Eqs. 6.15 or 6.16.
For the cautious policy the effective Markov transition matrix reads
X⟨T⟩|X=cX =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝X⟨T ⟩pp X⟨T ⟩pg
X⟨T ⟩gp X⟨T ⟩gg
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐
X=cX
=
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝ 1 0
pr 1− pr
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ . (6.25)
Its left eigenvector with eigenevalue one reads
σ(cX) =
(
σp(cX) σg(cX)
)
= (1 0) . (6.26)
As intuitively obvious, the agent remains in the prosperous state under the cautious
policy. The reward receivable from each state reads
TX⟨R⟩|X=cX =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝TX⟨R⟩p
TX⟨R⟩g
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐
X=cX
=
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝rl
0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ . (6.27)
As with the risky policy, the value V (X) for the cautious policy for the case γ = 1
is consistent with the calculations for 0 ≤ γ < 1 from above (Eqs. 6.19 or 6.20).
6.2.3 Paradigm definitions
These policies may be classified according to whether they are economic welfare
optimal or not, sustainable or not, and safe or not, as defined as follows:
Optimal
The definition for optimality is taken from a standard textbook:
A policy X is defined as optimal (in the economic welfare sense) if its
value Vs(X) (Eq. 6.9) for every state s is larger than or equal to the
value of any other policy (Puterman, 2005).
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Sustainable
Based on the Brundtland commission’s report on sustainable development (WCED,
1987) a sustainable policy should fulfill two requirements: First, meet the needs of the
present. This gets formally translated into the agent evaluating the present state s
as acceptable (similar to viable (Martinet and Doyen, 2007), tolerable (Petschel-Held
et al., 1999) or desirable (Heitzig et al., 2016)), if its value (Eq. 6.9) exceeds a
normatively chosen minimum acceptable value rmin:
s acceptable under X iff Vs(X) ≥ rmin (6.28)
Note that the division of state space into acceptable and unacceptable states is not
identical for all polices, but depends on the rewards receivable through executing a
policy. Second, a sustainable policy should sustain the ability to meet the needs of
the future (WCED, 1987).
Thus, a policy X is hereby defined as sustainable if every state the agent
eventually visits under policy X is acceptable (Eq. 6.28).
Note that this reduction of sustainability to the one-dimensional value Vs(X) has
much similarity with the notion of weak sustainability (Neumayer, 2003).
Safe
The Safe Operating Space (SOS; Rockström et al., 2009a) is typically defined as a
subset of the whole state space S, containing favorable system states bounded by
thresholds (Carpenter et al., 2015; Steffen et al., 2015a). In practice, the position of
these potential tipping thresholds is always uncertain and the boundaries are placed
at the lower end of the uncertainty zone. In that way the definition of the states
within the safe operating space constitutes a normative judgment about the risk
the decision maker is willing to tolerate. In the subsequent analyses the extreme
position of no risk tolerance will be taken and the SOS is identified with only the
(more favorable) prosperous state, independent of the collapse probability pc.
A policy X is hereby defined as safe if every state the agents eventually
visits under policy X lies within the SOS.
In contrast to acceptable and unacceptable states, SOS states are independent of
the policy used.
6.2.4 Analytical expressions for paradigms classification of policies
This section presents analytical results which tell whether the risky and the cautious
policy are optimal or not, sustainable or not and safe or not depending on the model
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parameters (pc, pr, γ, rl/rh, rmin/rh). Since all three rewards come in arbitrary units,
the policy classification only depends on their ratios. Readers not interested in the
mathematical details may safely skip this section.
Optimal
To derive the analytical expression of the hypersurface in parameter space that
separates the regions where either the risky or the cautious policy is optimal, one
has to set Vp(rX) != Vp(cX) (or equivalently Vg(rX) != Vg(cX), since the parameter
combination where a policy is optimal is independent from the state) and implicitly
obtains
rˆh · (1− pˆc)(1− γˆ(1− pˆr)) = rˆl · (1− γˆ(1− pˆc − pˆr)). (6.29)
Sustainable
To obtain the hypersurface that separates state s being acceptable from being not
acceptable under policyX one must apply the definition from Eq. 6.28: Vs(X) != rmin.
Hence, for the risky policy at the prosperous state one can set Vp(rX) != rmin and
obtains implicitly
rˆh · (1− pˆc))(1− γˆ(1− pˆr)) = rˆmin · (1− γˆ(1− pˆc − pˆr)). (6.30)
For the risky policy at the degraded state one can set Vg(rX) != rmin and obtains
implicitly
rˆh · (1− pˆc)pˆrγˆ = rˆmin · (1− γˆ(1− pˆc − pˆr)). (6.31)
For the cautious policy at the prosperous state one can set Vp(cX) != rmin and obtains
implicitly
rˆl = rˆmin. (6.32)
For the cautious policy at the degraded state one can set Vg(cX) != rmin and obtains
implicitly
rˆl · pˆrγˆ = rˆmin · (1− γˆ(1− pˆr)). (6.33)
To get from acceptability to sustainability for the risky policy one has to logically
combine Eqs. 6.30 and 6.31. The risky policy is sustainable only if both the prosperous
and the degraded state are acceptable since it will visit both states recurrently. The
safe policy is sustainable exactly where the prosperous state is acceptable since it will
eventually end up and remain at the prosperous state. Fig. 6.2 shows an example of
the acceptability division of state-parameter space and the resulting sustainability
division.
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Figure 6.2: Sustainable policies are based on acceptable states as illustrated here in the
parameter space (shown as collapse probability pc vs. farsightedness γ with the prosperous
state (a,c) and the degraded state (b,d)). Parameters are pr = 0.2, rl/rh = 0.5, rmin/rh = 0.3.
In (a,b) color indicates whether the respective state is acceptable under different policies. In
(c,d) color indicates the resulting sustainable policies.
Safe
The division of the parameter space according to the safe operating space paradigm
is obvious from its definition. Only the cautious policy is a safe policy since it will
eventually end up and remain in the prosperous, safe operating space state. The
risky policy switches recurrently between the prosperous and the degraded state
which makes it, by definition, not safe.
6.3 Discussion of results
In summary, the presented model of an agent-environmental tipping element depends
on the five parameters pc, pr, γ, rl/rh, rmin/rh: the probability of a collapse from the
prosperous to the degraded state under the high pressure action pc, the probability of
recovery from the degraded to the prosperous state under the low pressure action pr,
the agent’s farsightedness γ, the high reward receivable from the high pressure action
when staying at the prosperous state rh, the low reward receivable by taking the
low pressure action at the prosperous state rl, and the normatively chosen minimum
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Figure 6.3: Classification of the risky and cautious policy according to the three policy
paradigms: (a) optimization, (b) sustainability and (c) safe operating space in the model
parameter space (shown here as collapse probability pc vs. farsightedness γ); remaining
parameters were chosen as pr = 0.2, rl/rh = 0.5, rmin/rh = 0.3 for illustration purposes.
Colored regions result from analytically derived equations (see Sec. 6.2.4). Depending on the
parameter region, both risky and cautious policy can be optimal and sustainable. Only the
cautious policy is safe.
acceptable reward rmin a state value must have to be perceived as acceptable under a
certain policy. Since all three rewards come in arbitrary units, the policy classification
only depends on their ratios.
6.3.1 Classification of risky and cautious policy
Fig. 6.3 shows parameter regions in which the risky and the cautious policy are
optimal or not, sustainable or not and safe or not in the parameter space section
spanned by the discount factor γ and the collapse probability pc, using the derived
hypersurfaces (Eqs. 6.29 – 6.33). One can observe that above a certain critical
value of the collapse probability pc the cautious policy becomes optimal (Fig. 6.3 a,
pink), despite the smaller immediate reward rl = 0.5rh. This result confirms previous
findings on optimal management with regime shifts (Polasky et al., 2011b).
Further, one finds a decreasing critical collapse probability with increasing far-
sightedness γ. Hence, for more farsighted agents the risky policy is optimal only for
small collapse probabilities pc (orange).
Provided the low pressure reward exceeds the normative minimum acceptable
value threshold, rl ≥ rmin, then the cautious policy is sustainable for all parameter
combinations pc, pr, γ, rl/rh (Fig. 6.3 b, blue and purple). Only for small collapse
probabilities pc and simultaneously high farsightedness γ the risky policy becomes
sustainable as well (purple). This is because in this parameter region the risky policy
is acceptable also at the degraded state.
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The cautious policy is a safe policy independently from the parameter combinations
pc, pr, γ, rl/rh, rmin/rh (Fig. 6.3 c, green). There is no combination of parameters at
which the risky policy is safe.
6.3.2 Relationships between paradigms
Which paradigm should a policy maker choose?, one might ask. Is there a paradigm
superior to the other ones? Yet, one finds that policies can carry all logical combina-
tions of the three examined paradigms (optimization, sustainability, safe operating
space) in the parameter space of the presented model. In other words, policies can
be all combinations of optimal or not, sustainable or not and safe or not. This yields
a classification of policies into eight different categories (Fig. 6.4). Among them are
four to be discussed in more detail:
opt & not sus. In particular, optimal policies are not necessarily sustainable (Fig. 6.4,
red and yellow). This is the case if the normative value threshold rmin is too
large. The cautious policy does not return enough value to be sustainable
(rl < rmin, yellow) and the risky policy at the degraded state produces too little
future reward to be sustainable, due to the low chance of recovery and lack of
farsightedness.
opt & not safe. Nor are optimal policies necessarily safe (Fig. 6.4, red and purple).
This occurs in parameter regions where the risky policy is optimal. The risky
policy cannot be safe because of the risk of collapse to the degraded state.
safe & not sus. A safe policy does not necessarily imply a sustainable policy ei-
ther (Fig. 6.4, green and yellow). When the normative threshold value for
sustainability rmin exceeds the reward from a low pressure action rl: rmin > rl,
then the cautious policy is safe but not sustainable. Following a similar line
of argument, the SOS concept(Rockström et al., 2009a) has been extended
to a Safe And Just Operating Space (SAJOS) which additionally accounts
for social indicators (Raworth, 2017), such as the number of people living in
extreme poverty. Thus, SAJOS policies can be interpreted as the overlap of safe
with sustainable policies. Within the presented model, one can give a definite
criterion for when this form of SAJOS exists: as long as the reward from a low
pressure action rl exceeds the normative threshold value rmin (rl > rmin), the
cautious policy is both safe and sustainable (Fig. 6.4, cyan and gray).
sus & not safe. However, there exist also sustainable policies outside the SOS
(Fig. 6.4, blue and purple.) These are risky policies (hence, not safe) with
simultaneously high farsightedness γ and low collapse probability pc. At those
parameter regions the degraded state is still evaluated as acceptable due to
sufficient anticipated future rewards and therefore the risky policy is sustainable.
The circumstance that parameter regimes exist that are sustainable but not safe
and vice versa clearly stems from our definition of sustainability which resembles
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Figure 6.4: Paradigms combinations for risky and cautious policy. There exist policies in
parameter space of this model for all logical combinations of paradigm classifications (a), i.e.
a policy can be any combination of (not) optimal, (not) sustainable and (not) safe. Remaining
parameters where chosen as pr = 0.2, rl/rh = 0.5 for illustration purposes. For a sufficiently
low normative threshold value rmin ≤ rl (here rmin/rh = 0.3) a Safe And Just Operating
Space (SAJOS) exists, which was identified as the overlap of safe and sustainable policies
(b,d) (gray and cyan area). For a sufficiently large rmin > rl (here rmin/rh = 0.7) a SAJOS
does not exist (c,e).
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Figure 6.5: Fraction of parameter space volumes for all eight paradigms combination.
All parameters (pc, pr, γ, rl/rh, rmin/rh) were chosen linearly between 0 and 1 for both the
risky and the cautious policy. As a direct consequence of the definitions of the safe operating
space paradigm and the cautious and risky policy, all paradigm combinations which are safe
correspond to the use of the cautious policy, in all others the risky policy was applied. A
random decision making agent within a random tipping element will most likely end up with
a policy that is neither optimal, neither sustainable nor safe, followed by the parameter sweet
spot regime where the policy is simultaneously optimal, sustainable and safe. Interestingly, the
third likeliest option is a parameter regime which is optimal, but neither sustainable nor safe.
a form of weak sustainability (Neumayer, 2003). By doing so one can conceptually
separate the issues of environmental safety from social justice without compromising
the target of a safe and just parameter space regime.
Note that this classification into the eight different policy paradigm combinations
also applies to the case of absolute farsightedness (γ = 1; see the tops of Fig. 6.4 b-e).
Thus, the trade-offs between the examined paradigms do not vanish, as one might
presume considering the debate about appropriate discount rates (Nordhaus, 2007;
Stern, 2008).
6.3.3 Volume of paradigm combinations
The previous section demonstrated that there exists no master paradigm among
the three examined within the presented model. Hence, policies may carry all eight
logical combinations of (not) optimal, (not) sustainable and (not) safe.
This section asks how large these eight regimes of paradigm combinations are in the
whole parameter space. Fig. 6.5 shows the largest regime to be the combination that
is neither optimal, neither sustainable nor safe followed by the parameter sweet spot
regime in which all paradigms yield the cautious policy as optimal, sustainable and
safe. Together they constitute a parameter space volume of approx. 45% in which the
three paradigms of economic optimization, sustainability and safe operating space
align with each other in yielding the same policy. Interestingly, the third likeliest
option is the paradigm combination in which the risky policy is optimal but neither
sustainable nor safe. This is the most likeliest parameter regime among those where
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the paradigms yield different policies. Thus, blindly applying economic optimization
in this stylized tipping element has a significant chance of leading to policies that
are neither sustainable nor safe.
On the other hand, the volume of the safe and just operating space (gray and cyan
bars in Fig. 6.5) is comparable to the most likeliest (black) regime. Thus, about
one out of four random decision making agents interacting with a random tipping
element will end up in the safe and just operating space.
6.3.4 Application to real-world human-environment tipping elements
The above policy classification offers valuable insights for the governance of real-world
human-environment systems. This section discusses how this analysis relates to the
cases of the climate system, fisheries and farming. The purpose of this discussion is
to gain a qualitative understanding how the presented model relates to important
real-world challenges of environmental governance, not a detailed assessment of the
latter.
Therefore, the respective collapse and recovery probabilities per time step pc and
pr of the model are estimated via the typical timescales on which these systems
remain in one state or the other (see below). A model time step is mapped to a year.
Let p be the probability per time step that a system state will transition into another
state. The average number of time steps the system will be in that state is given by
⟨D⟩ = (1− p)/p. Inverting yields p = 1/(⟨D⟩+ 1). Thus, a collapse timescale of e.g.
50 years corresponds to a collapse probability of pc ≈ 0.02. Tab. 6.1 summarizes the
assumed transition timescales and corresponding transition probabilities.
Climate Fishery Farming
Assumed collapse timescale [years] ∼ 40 ∼ 20 ∼ 100
Corresponding collapse probability ∼ 0.025 ∼ 0.045 ∼ 0.01
Assumed recovery timescale [years] →∼∞ ∼ 50 ∼ 300
Corresponding recovery probability →∼ 0 ∼ 0.02 ∼ 0.003
Table 6.1: Typical transition timescales and corresponding probabilities.
Additionally, a parameter sensitivity analysis is added by visualizing the likelihood
of ending up in a certain parameter regime by color gradients between regimes
(Fig. 6.6).
Climate system. Regarding the climate system, one has to acknowledge that several
interacting tipping elements contribute to the system’s behavior (Lenton et al., 2008)
and its representation as a single tipping element is a huge simplification on its
own. Nevertheless, it is assumed that the current state of the climate system is
still comparable to the prosperous one of our model. If planetary thresholds are
86
6.3 Discussion of results
Figure 6.6: Human-environment systems in paradigms combinations for risky and cau-
tious policy here shown in model parameter space of collapse probability pc versus re-
covery probability pr. Color indicates the paradigms combination similarly as in Fig. 6.4.
Here, additional gradual changes between the color regimes indicate the probability of
being in a certain paradigms combinations regime under parameter uncertainty ranges.
Remaining parameters where chosen linearly within the range of 0.95 ≤ γ ≤ 0.99,
0.3 ≤ rl/rh ≤ 0.7, 0.1 ≤ rmin/rh ≤ 0.5. The approx. transition probabilities pc and pr
were assigned to the human-environment systems climate, fisheries and farming according to
the typical timescale these systems spent in one state. For farming, a risky policy is likely to be
optimal but neither sustainable nor safe. The parameter uncertainty of the other parameters
does not allow a clear statement in which parameter regime fisheries are likely to fall. The
climate system may lie at the edge of the sweet spot, where all paradigms yield the cautious
policy. However, for a smaller collapse probability pc optimization is more likely to yield the
risky policy, which becomes also neither sustainable nor safe at this point.
crossed, there is the risk to enter a Hothouse Earth state (Steffen et al., 2018), in
analogy to the model’s degraded state. Relevant timescales for triggering a collapse lie
within 30 to 50 years under a business-as-usual socio-economic development scenario
(Lenton et al., 2008; Rockström et al., 2017; Schellnhuber et al., 2016). Regarding
the recovery timescale it has been shown that human perturbations of the climate
system already changed its trajectory on a multi-millennial timescale (Clark et al.,
2016; Ganopolski et al., 2016). Therefore a recovery probability per time step pr
close to zero is assumed (Fig. 6.6).
For sufficiently large collapse probabilities (collapse timescale near 30 years and
smaller), the climate system is likely to reside in a parameter sweet spot (gray
area), where applying an optimization, sustainability or SOS paradigm results in the
cautious policy as the advisable way of governing the climate system. However, if the
collapse probability per time step is smaller (collapse timescales near 50 years and
larger) the situation is different. Here, an SOS and a sustainable paradigm would
still yield the cautious policy (Fig. 6.6, cyan), but an optimization paradigm is likely
to give the risky policy (Fig. 6.6, red), which at this point is neither sustainable nor
safe. One can conclude that in climate policy, economic welfare optimization alone
may be neither sustainable nor safe.
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Fisheries. For fishery systems, both transition probabilities certainly depend on
a variety of factors, e.g. fisher’s technical and cultural traits or the dominant fish
species in the system, as well as external factors such as climate change influencing
habitat condition (Möllmann et al., 2009; Worm et al., 2009). The timescale of a
fisheries collapse has been shown to lie within decades (Costello et al., 2008). Roughly
consistent with observational and modeled data from the Baltic sea, where the stable
regime of high cod biomass lasted approximately from 1970 to 1990 (Möllmann et al.,
2009; Österblom et al., 2007), a typical collapse timescale of around 20 years is
assumed. Concerning the typical recovery timescale, successful attempts of fish stock
recovery lasted for decades (Hutchings and Reynolds, 2004), but is estimated to
generally exceed this duration (Caddy and Agnew, 2004). Therefore a larger typical
recovery timescale of around 50 years is assumed.
The color gradient in Fig. 6.6 at the fisheries point does not clearly single out a
paradigms regime, indicating the dependence on the other parameters at this point.
A risky policy might be economically optimal but not sustainable (Fig. 6.6, red).
The risky policy eventually leads to the collapse of fish stock (c.f. Costello et al.,
2008). At the collapsed and degraded state the conditions for the fishers are not
acceptable. Therefore they have to leave the system and cannot wait for the fish’s
recovery. Yet, further investigation is needed to reduce the uncertainty with respect
to the other parameters.
Farming. Last, the case of land degradation by farming is considered. Land
degradation and restoration is a complex topic with many influencing factors (Blaikie
and Brookfield, 2015). Nevertheless, land degradation by farming has been identified
as a tipping element by Kinzig et al. (2006), where the authors discuss the case of the
western Australian wheatbelt with a typical collapse timescale of about 100 years.
Soil recovery is estimated to take place within 20 to 1000 years (Horrigan et al.,
2002), which is roughly consistent with Kinzig et al. (2006), where the duration
to reach equilibrium again is estimated with up to 300 years. Therefore, a typical
recovery timescale of about 300 years is assumed.
In contrast to climate and fisheries, the transition probabilities for the process of
land degradation by farming suggests, that here an optimality paradigm is very likely
to yield the risky policy which is neither sustainable nor safe despite considerate
parameter uncertainty (red area in Fig. 6.6)
Taken together, it is interesting to see that the climate system in particular may
reside at the edge of the parameter regime where economic welfare optimization
becomes neither sustainable nor safe (Fig. 6.6). For land degradation by farming, the
previous assessment suggests that an optimal policy is likely to yield a non-sustainable
and non-safe policy whereas for fisheries the situation is less clear.
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6.4 Summary
Overall, this chapter presented a model of a single-agent tipping element environ-
ment, designed above the agent-environment interface. This model was used to
systematically compare the three governance paradigms of economic optimization,
sustainability and safe operating space. The results in this chapter show that in this
model, there exists no master paradigm among those three. Policies can be classified
by any combination of optimal, sustainable and safe. A master paradigm, in contrast,
would guarantee fulfilling requirements imposed by other paradigms. Consequently,
the selection of appropriate policy paradigms, especially in more complex settings
and models, can be critical for effective environmental governance.
Specifically, it was shown theoretically as well as empirically that economic welfare
optimization for managing tipping elements may be neither sustainable nor safe.
Theoretically, this is the case, since the volume of the corresponding paradigm
combination in parameter space is the largest among those in which the three
paradigms actually yield different policies. This suggests the conclusion that the
mere structure of a tipping element causes a comparable high chance of obtaining a
policy that is neither sustainable nor safe when blindly following an optimization
paradigm. Empirically, it was demonstrated that especially in the case of land
degradation through farming, optimization may be neither sustainable nor safe.
On the other hand, the presented analysis also indicates parameter regimes where
economic optimization can safely and sustainably be used. Consider a random tipping
element, there is almost a 50% chance that the three paradigms align with each
other. Thus, optimization can very well lead to a safe and just operating space, but
it is not guaranteed to do so.
The absence of a master paradigm is of special relevance for governing the climate
system, since the latter may reside at the edge between parameter regimes where
economic welfare optimization becomes neither sustainable nor safe.
Further, simple heuristics were presented, to anticipate when a policy is economic
welfare optimal, sustainable and safe. A risky policy may be optimal when the
probability of collapse and/or the farsightedness are sufficiently small. It may be
sustainable when the probability of a collapse is sufficiently small but the farsight-
edness is sufficiently large. However, it cannot be safe. A cautious policy may be
optimal when the collapse probability and/or the farsightedness are sufficiently large.
It is sustainable if its immediate reward exceeds the normatively chosen minimum
acceptable reward and it is always safe.
Outlook. Extensions are possible in many directions. Constrained optimization
(Altman, 1999) is a straight-forward way to combine the paradigms examined. Policy
makers could aim for a policy that delivers the maximum economic welfare and is safe
and sustainable, or likewise, least-cost safe target strategies (Ackerman et al., 2009).
This is certainly a better approach than relying on economic welfare optimization
alone for model-based policy advice. Examples of models for policy advice certainly
include integrated assessment models or the use of the maximum sustainable yield
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in fisheries management. However, one might not even desire to obtain the welfare
optimal safe and sustainable policy in the first place but e.g. the most resilient one,
which calls for an operationalization of modern social-ecological resilience concepts
(Donges and Barfuss, 2017, P2).
With respect to self-learning agents the results of this chapter call for novel
algorithms, which take in a sustainability and safety perspective from the foundations
of their design. Such endeavors may have fruitful synergies with the research field
of beneficial and safe artificial intelligence (Amodei et al., 2016). A common key
challenge here presents the topic of safe exploration, i.e. how a learning agent can
safely explore an unknown environment without choosing a truly undesirable action.
The application of the presented model to real-world systems in this chapter is
of qualitative, illustrative nature. A more detailed analysis of real world tipping
elements in which typical transition probabilities might be estimated from empirical
time series could be a way forward to systematize and draw lessons from the multitude
of human-environmental tipping elements (Rocha et al., 2014).
Applying this kind of analyses to larger, more complex Markov decision pro-
cesses would be a way to extend the understanding of the relationships between
the paradigms examined. Moreover, it may be desirable to include further policy
paradigms into the analyses, e.g. aiming for a large option space of future decision
makers (Fleurbaey, 2015; Schellnhuber, 1999). Such analyses may help policy makers
in their decisions on how to translate the Sustainable Development Goals and the
Paris agreement into concrete policy implementations.
Python code for the reproduction of the reported results plus interactive versions of the figures is
available at github: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1495578.
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Conclusion
Ich, Herr Hans Wurst, habe aus meinem Fall einige
Lehren gezogen mit knapper Mühe und Not.
Hans Wurst - from Paul Dessau’s Einstein: Epilogue
7.1 Contributions
This thesis is a physicist’s contribution to deepen the theoretical understanding of
coupled social-ecological systems, investigating the question what preconditions are
required so that collective action towards sustainability can succeed. Thereby, it
contributes to the increasing multidisciplinarity of physics (Sinatra et al., 2015) and
in particular extends the realm of social (Castellano et al., 2009; Perc et al., 2017) to
social-ecological physics.
As the foundational design principle, this thesis proposed the use of the agent-
environment interface as known from e.g. Sutton and Barto (1998) for social-ecological
systems modeling. As Chapter 2 showed, it is by no means the only design principle
upon which social-ecological system models can be build. Yet, doing so has certain
advantages. The agent-environment interface presents a unifying perspective across
many scientific fields, offering valuable insights for social-ecological systems research.
At the same time, it is a comparably simple framework, enabling social-ecological
system models to be put into mathematical practice, even with analytical results. The
interface offers a clear plug-and-play usage, allowing the straight forward comparison
of different rules for the agents’ choices and environmental dynamics. This offered
valuable insights, as shown in Chapter 4 by comparing different learning dynamics
across different environments, or as shown in Chapter 6 by comparing different
decision paradigms with each other. As the environment explicitly occurs, the use of
the agent-environment interface offered clear guidance in extending social dilemmas
in repeated games to social-ecological dilemmas in stochastic games (Chapter 5) and
Markov decision processes (Chapter 6).
Before such a social-ecological dilemma could be examined by the means of learning
dynamics, learning equations capable of learning in multiple state environments had
to be derived. By combining techniques of the statistical physics literature on
learning dynamics with established reinforcement learning algorithms from artificial
intelligence research, Chapter 4 presented a novel methodological extension to derive a
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deterministic limit of so-called temporal difference reinforcement learning algorithms.
With respect to the three parameters governing the learning of an agent, Chapter
4 showed that the exploitation level and farsightedness control where the learners
adapt to in behavior space, weighting current reward, expected future reward and the
level of forgetting. The learning rate controls how fast the learners adapt along these
directions. Demonstrated across multiple example environments, the derived learning
equations reveal a variety of dynamical regimes, such as fixed points, periodic orbits
and deterministic chaos.
Eventually, these learning equations have been applied to a particular environment,
termed the Ecological Public Good, which models a coupled social-ecological dilemma
(Chapter 5). Thereby this thesis contributes to a better understanding of social-
ecological systems by combining two previously independently studied topics: i)
the emergence of cooperation in stochastic games (Hilbe et al., 2018), and ii) so-
called collective risk dilemmas (Milinski et al., 2008). As such, the relationship
between the farsightedness of the agents and the expected impact in the case of
environmental collapse could be examined, with respect to the emergence and stability
of cooperation. By a combination of analytical and numerical methods, the theoretical
result that cooperation requires a minimum farsightedness could be reproduced (Hilbe
et al., 2018). Additionally, each point in behavior space could be associated with a
critical farsightedness, above which agents learn to cooperate. Further, the empirical
observation that the more severe the expected collapse impact, the more likely the
emergence of cooperation (Milinski et al., 2008), could be explained.
With respect to the emergence of cooperation from an initial defective behavior,
three qualitatively different parameter regimes could be identified: i) an always
cooperate regime, in which risk and damage are so large, that the agents will learn
to cooperate, regardless of their farsightedness; ii) a farsightedness regime, where it
depends on the farsightedness of the agents, if they learn to cooperate from a full
defection initial behavior; and iii) a metaphorical black hole regime, where these
agents are not able to learn to cooperate from full defection, even if they have full
farsightedness. It was shown that such a black hole regime exits regardless of the
collapse risk, if the suffering due to environmental collapse is less than the suffering
due to being exploited in the social dilemma. Agents prefer to collectively suffer in
environmental collapse, than cooperating in a prosperous environment.
With respect to the stability of cooperation for heterogeneous agents, i.e. when
one agent changes its parameters, it was shown through analytical and numerical
calculations that an individual learner can keep the cooperation solution stable
despite considerate shortsightedness. However, this is only the case if its leverage
to collapse the environment and the damages in the case of collapse are large. This
means, that a reward optimizing learner who does not believe in likely and severe
consequences of a tipping catastrophe will break off the cooperation agreement.
Finally, taking up earlier critiques of optimization approaches for environmental
governance, Chapter 6 systematically compares the three decision making paradigms
of economic welfare optimization, sustainability and the safe operating space for
the governance of a single-agent tipping element environment. It was shown that
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optimization alone can lead to safe and sustainable behaviors and policies, but is by
no means guaranteed to do so. In fact, there exits no master paradigm among those
three, i.e. policies exist in the parameter space of this model which can be classified
by any combination of optimal, sustainable and safe. A master paradigm, in contrast,
would guarantee fulfilling requirements imposed by other paradigms. Consequently,
the selection of appropriate policy paradigms, especially in more complex settings
and models, can be critical for effective environmental governance. Further, the
absence of a master paradigm is of special relevance for governing the climate system,
since the latter may reside at the edge between parameter regimes where economic
optimization becomes neither sustainable nor safe.
7.2 Outlook
This thesis demonstrated the usefulness of the agent-environment interface as a design
principle for social-ecological system models. Both methodological extensions, as
well as further applications to questions regarding the preconditions for sustainability
present promising pathways for stimulating future research.
Extension of the agent-environment interface to a multi-layer network perspec-
tive. On a technical, methodological level, future work could extend the agent-
environment interface as a multi-layer network (Boccaletti et al., 2014). Four different
kinds of network layers may encode different kinds of agent-agent interactions (Fig.
7.1).
In a directed action-observation layer, agent i forms a connection to agent j if i is
able to observe the current action of agent j. Many models of opinion formation on
social networks (e.g. Klemm et al., 2003; San Miguel et al., 2005) can be imagined
to happen on this layer if one sees opinions as equivalent to actions. Here, it can be
of interest to compare different imitation mechanisms: agents imitate other agents’
actions directly vs. agents obtain a positive reward when choosing identical actions
(c.f. Banisch and Olbrich, 2018).
In a directed reward-signal-observation layer, agent i is connected to agent j if
i is able to observe the reward-signal of j. A model, such as the one presented in
Chapter 2, which uses a reward-based imitation scheme utilizes this layer together
with the action-observation layer. This reward-signal-observation layer differentiates
between a reward signal, that can be in principle observed by other agents, and the
true reward an agent perceives to update its behavior. The case when reward and
reward signal differ from agent to agent seems of particular interest for future work.
In the directed reward-signal layer, agent i is connected to j if the reward-signal
of j depends on i’s actions. Typically, evolutionary game theory studies on networks
utilize this layer (e.g. Perc et al., 2013; Perc and Szolnoki, 2010; Wang et al., 2015).
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Figure 7.1: Agent-environment interface as a multi-layer network
Finally, in the undirected transition layer agent i and agent j are connected if the
state transition probability depends on the joint action of i and j. Conceptually,
such a transition layer is similar to a Markov random field (Lauritzen, 1996), which
is an interesting connection to be explored.
Thus, perceiving the agent-environment interface as a multi-layer network would
have the advantage to present an even more unifying perspective, additionally
incorporating scientific fields, such as models of opinion formation (e.g. Klemm et al.,
2003), evolutionary dynamics on networks (e.g. Perc and Szolnoki, 2010), and even
graphical models (e.g. Lauritzen, 1996). As such, it may be a starting point to
reconcile models, similar to the one presented in Chapter 2 with the models of the
remainder of this thesis within a common framework.
Further, within this framework future work could extend the dynamical systems
description presented in Chapter 4 to partial observability of the Markov states of
the environment (Oliehoek, 2012; Spaan, 2012), behavior profiles with history, and
other-regarding agent (i.e. joint-action) learners (c.f. Busoniu et al., 2008 for an
overview of other-regarding agent learning algorithms). Also agents that learn an
explicit model of the environment (Hester and Stone, 2012) might turn out to be
useful for social-ecological systems research. Further, the combination of individual
and social learning (Bandura, 1977; Banisch and Olbrich, 2018; Smolla et al., 2015)
seems promising.
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Application to questions related to collective action for sustainability. Within
the perspective of the agent-environment interface as a multi-layer network, relevant
research questions can be asked. For example, with respect to self-learning agents
novel algorithms are of great interest which take in a sustainability and safety
perspective from the foundations of their design. Endeavors to find such algorithms
may have fruitful synergies with the research field of beneficial and safe artificial
intelligence (Amodei et al., 2016). A common key challenge here is the topic of safe
exploration, i.e. how a learning agent can safely explore an unknown environment
without choosing a truly undesirable action. Moving forward with operationalizing
modern facets of social-ecological resilience, as proposed by Donges and Barfuss
(2017, P2), may also contribute to finding safe and sustainable learning algorithms.
Further of interest may be to study how learning agents compare when applied in
different environments, each presenting a challenge for sustainability. For example,
such environments may represent the harvesting of common-pool renewable resources
(Lindkvist and Norberg, 2014; Schill et al., 2015) or the prevention of dangerous
climate change (Barrett and Dannenberg, 2012; Milinski et al., 2008). Such studies,
in which these challenges are examined individually, could lead to further, more
complicated environments, in which such individual challenges are subsequently com-
bined. Here, examining effects of heterogeneous agents and inequality (Vasconcelos
et al., 2014) remain of great interest.
The studies presented in this thesis which used the agent-environment interface
had a strong behavioral focus. Social institutions and norms (Nyborg et al., 2016)
have not yet been purposely included, albeit their importance for collective action
towards sustainability. Future work could explore the mechanisms how social norms
emergence from the agent’s collective behavior.
Last, an important descriptive question concerns the modeling of human behavior
in social-ecological system models (Schlüter et al., 2017). Here, two questions may
turn out to be productive: i) What characteristics does a model of human behavior
have to fulfill in order to be appropriate for the use in social-ecological system
models? ii) Which model fulfills these characteristics best? With respect to the
first question, social science theories of human decision making in combination with
behavioral experiments could lead to a computational test suite. Towards answering
the second question, computational models of human behavior could be compared
within this test suite, receiving each a score measuring how well they performed
across multiple different environments. Subsequently extending this test suit may
thus lead to increasingly better models of human behavior for social-ecological system
models.
All together, such endeavors could lead to a deeper theoretical understanding
of social-ecological systems to be put into practical use to find and influence the
preconditions for successful collective action towards ecologically safe and socially
just sustainability.
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